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In a storable good market, we investigate a firm’s pricing policy and the welfare ef-
fects associated with the firm’s ability to commit to future prices in the presence of time-
varying production costs. We show that, if costs are expected to increase, the firm’s lack
of commitment leads to lower prices than full commitment when consumer storage costs
are relatively small and demand is not too convex. This enhances consumer surplus and,
under certain circumstances, total welfare. For intermediate consumer storage costs, the
firm’s full commitment generally benefits consumers and, a fortiori, the whole economy.
Our analysis provides potentially significant empirical and policy implications, especially
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1 Introduction
A critical issue for a firm that operates in a storable good market is to deal with the consumers’
storage incentives. Systematic empirical evidence shows that consumers are willing to stock-
pile goods for later consumption when they anticipate higher future prices (e.g., Erdem et al.
2003; Hendel and Nevo 2004, 2006a, 2006b; Osborne 2018; Perrone 2017; Pesendorfer 2002;
Pires 2016; Wang 2015). A natural reason that induces a firm to modify its prices over time is
a variation in production costs. As reported in an article appeared on The New York Times
in February 2018 (Horton 2018), Taiwanese consumers rushed to retail stores, including large-
sized hypermarkets, and stockpiled significant quantities of toilet paper after they discovered
that toilet paper suppliers would shortly increase product prices up to 30% as a result of rising
pulp prices. An article appeared on the Financial Times in October 2018 (Abboud and Gray
2018) revealed that leading consumer goods companies, such as Procter & Gamble in the US
and Unilever in Europe, notified their customers of higher future charges due to rising costs of
raw materials.1
We consider a dynamic storable good market where a monopolistic firm exhibits produc-
tion costs that evolve over time and faces a continuum of consumers that are willing to store
in anticipation of higher future prices. In this framework, we characterize the firm’s pricing
policy and investigate the welfare effects associated with the firm’s ability to commit to fu-
ture prices. Under full commitment, the firm credibly announces a price for each period and
complies with this pricing policy. Under limited commitment, the firm cannot refrain from re-
vising the announced price in a sequentially optimal manner. The price comparisons between
the two commitment regimes depend on a range of factors, such as the magnitude of consumer
storage costs and the curvature of demand. When production costs are expected to increase,
we show that, for sufficiently small consumer storage costs, a firm with limited commitment pow-
ers charges lower prices than under full commitment as long as demand is not too convex.
Therefore, the pricing policy under limited commitment generates higher consumer surplus
and, despite the firm’s loss, under certain circumstances, it can even enhance total welfare.
As under limited commitment the firm cares about its continuation profits, one might be-
lieve that the firm should be more inclined to set higher prices than under full commitment
in response to future cost increases. Indeed, we show that higher production costs over time
can lead to lower prices under limited commitment than under full commitment. To under-
stand the rationale for this result, it is helpful to start with the case of full commitment. When
the increase in production costs exceeds the consumer storage cost, the firm prefers to stim-
ulate consumer storage in order to avoid higher future production costs. In equilibrium, the
firm commits to a price sequence that induces consumers to store the entire demand for future
consumption. Under limited commitment, this outcome is no longer achievable, because the
firm succumbs to the temptation to reduce the price below the full commitment level and to
serve the future residual demand. Anticipating the firm’s opportunistic behavior, consumers
1The costs of inputs and raw materials are likely to show increasing trends over a period of time.
For instance, from December 2018 to April 2019 the Commodity Industrial Inputs Price Index in-
creased by 11.1% and the Commodity Fuel (energy) Index increased by 15.9%. Data are available at
https://www.indexmundi.com/commodities/ (last retrieved in December 2019).
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are more reluctant to store. In order to discourage production and sales in the second period,
the firm can manipulate the price in the first period. Notably, this affects the firm’s problem in
a non-trivial manner. On the one hand, a lower first period price stimulates consumer storage.
Ceteris paribus, this reduces production and sales in the second period. On the other hand, a
lower first period price leads to an increase in the second period demand gross of consumer
storage, which is driven by a corresponding lower second period price. This is because the
storability (no-arbitrage) constraint is binding in equilibrium in order to make consumers in-
different about storing, and therefore a change in the first period price translates into a change
in the second period price in the same direction. The result of this trade-off is that, if the in-
crease in consumer storage outweighs the increase in the second period gross demand, a lower
first period price reduces the second period demand net of consumer storage. This occurs if
and only if the second period residual demand is upward sloping with respect to the first
period price. The decline in the second period production and sales stemming from a lower
first period price mitigates the firm’s loss from the lack of commitment. As shown in Section
6, the condition for upward sloping residual demand is that the demand function is not too
convex. Given that the storability constraint is binding irrespective of the firm’s commitment
powers and therefore a lower price in the first period entails a lower price in the second period
as well, the pricing policy under limited commitment definitely enhances consumer surplus.
Remarkably, if the future residual demand is sufficiently small, the gain in consumer surplus
more than compensates the firm’s loss from the lack of commitment. Hence, the pricing policy
under limited commitment can even increase total welfare.
For intermediate values of consumer storage costs, we find that the firm’s full commitment
tends to benefit consumers and, a fortiori, the whole economy. The lower capability to pro-
mote efficient consumer storage induces a firm with limited commitment powers to charge
higher prices (at least in the first period) and to forgo consumer storage even when it is ex ante
profitable. Alternatively, consumer storage cannot be prevented despite being ex ante subop-
timal, which again translates into higher prices. If consumer storage costs are large enough, the
static monopoly solution applies irrespective of the firm’s commitment powers, and therefore
the commitment problem is welfare inconsequential.
In the baseline model, we abstract from the possibility that the firm also engages in stor-
age activities. This allows us to investigate the effects of consumer storage in a tractable and
transparent manner. Our approach seems to be reasonable in various storable good markets,
especially at the downstream level. Empirical and anecdotal evidence suggests that retailers
prefer to induce consumers to stockpile some products rather than accumulate them in the
form of inventories (e.g., Blattberg et al. 1981; Pesendorfer 2002).2 Retail stores can have in-
centives to minimize the time period where the unsold products remain on their shelves by
promoting sales that result in consumer storage. For instance, a number of goods, including
food and dairy products, are delicate and require specific conditions to preserve their quality.
Bulky items, such as paper products, often occupy valuable space. Despite these considera-
2As reported by Blattberg et al. (1981, p. 117), “[s]helf space is a major concern for food retailers. Products and
suppliers vie vigorously for shelf space. On the other hand, for a number of consumers the cost of some additional
storage space is extremely low. Another dozen boxes of tissue in the bathroom closet or an additional case of
pickles in the fruit cellar is of almost no concern”.
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tions, it is plausible that, in some storable good markets where costs are expected to increase,
firms benefit from holding inventories, which may coexist with consumer storage. In Section
8, we allow for inventory accumulation and find that, under fairly general circumstances, our
qualitative results are unaffected.
The firm’s commitment issue that we identify in a storable goodmarket exhibits significant
differences with respect to the classical Coase (1972) problem of a durable good monopolist,
which succumbs to the temptation to charge lower future prices in order to capture the con-
sumers with lower valuations. In Section 8, we show that our analysis reveals novel features in
various aspects, such as the mechanics behind the results and the properties of the equilibrium
price sequence. To appreciate even further the difference between storable and durable goods,
it is worth noting that, contrary to the case of durable goods, the firm’s commitment problem
emerges with storable goods exactly when costs are expected to increase.
The predictions of our model are naturally pertinent to markets for storable goods with
some degree of maturity, where demand tends to be stable but production costs vary over time.
In developed countries, markets for various groceries and beverages, which can be generally
stored for future consumption, are nowadays relatively mature and their demand tends to be
flat over time.3 As regards time-varying production costs, we focus on situations where input
markets are in “contango”. This means that the futures price is higher than the spot price, and
therefore the price is expected to rise in the future.4
The model presented in our paper is robust and does not resort to any unduly restrictive
assumptions on the functional forms. In Section 8, the analysis is extended to a number of di-
rections, such as firm’s inventories, convex storage costs, uncertainty about production costs,
convex production costs, longer time horizon, and a more general discount factor. As exten-
sively discussed in Section 9, our study sheds new light on the empirical evidence about the
firms’ propensity to pass their cost changes on to consumers. In various industries, it is pos-
sible to construct sufficiently accurate indicators to forecast cost fluctuations. We identify a
novel channel that connects intertemporal cost variations, storability and demand curvature
with the patterns of cost pass-through rates and firms’ markups. Our study also provides
potentially significant policy implications in different areas, including the welfare effects of
commodity taxation and the antitrust scrutiny of the firms’ instruments to improve their com-
mitment power.
Related literature The economic literature on storable goods is fairly extensive. An early
relevant contribution is Be´nabou (1989), which characterizes the optimal pricing policy of a
storable good monopolist operating in an inflationary environment vis-a`-vis a continuum of
speculators. In each period, the firm must decide whether to adjust its price to the rate of
inflation by incurring a “menu cost”, while the speculators engage in storage activities that
are detrimental to the firm’s profits. Differently from Be´nabou (1989), in our setting the firm is
3For instance, the US consumer (real) expenditure on a number of food items has been quite stable over the last
years. Details can be found at https://www.bls.gov/cex/2017/standard/multiyr.pdf (last retrieved in December
2019).
4As will be clear in the subsequent analysis, when input markets are in “backwardation” and therefore the price
is expected to decline in the future, the firm’s commitment powers are inconsequential.
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able to costlessly change its price, which is not eroded by inflation, andmay prefer to stimulate
consumer storage in anticipation of higher future production costs. Moreover, we investigate
the impact of the firm’s commitment powers on the equilibrium pricing policy and the asso-
ciated welfare effects. Jeuland and Narasimhan (1985) find that price discrimination among
consumers with different demand functions provides an explanation for temporary discounts
in storable good markets. In a model where a share of consumers can store the good for future
consumption, Hong et al. (2002) show that consumer storage leads to equilibrium price disper-
sion. Our study is closely related to the seminal paper of Dudine et al. (2006), which considers
a storable good market where demand varies deterministically over time and a monopolistic
firm faces a continuum of consumers that have incentives to store in anticipation of higher
future prices. In this framework, consumer storage unambiguously harms the firm’s profits,
because it reduces future sales occurring at higher prices. Hence, a firm with full commitment
powers selects a price sequence that completely removes consumer storage. Under limited
commitment, the firm succumbs to the temptation to increase the second period price to the
static monopoly level in response to the absence of consumer storage. To mitigate wasteful
storage driven by the consumers’ anticipation of the firm’s opportunistic behavior, the firm
increases the price in the first period. As a result, the firm’s lack of commitment reduces con-
sumer surplus and the firm’s profits, which is definitely welfare detrimental. In this setting,
Antoniou and Fiocco (2019) show that a firm with limited commitment powers has strategic
incentives to hold inventories when facing the possibility of buyer stockpiling. Inventory ac-
cumulation mitigates the firm’s loss from the lack of commitment. Given that the costs of
inventories are sunk once they have been incurred, the firm holds inventories to reduce future
costs, which alleviates the firm’s temptation to charge higher future prices and relaxes the con-
sumers’ storage incentives. In the current paper, we explore an alternative legitimate reason
for time-varying prices, namely, intertemporal variations in the firm’s production costs. As
discussed in Section 9, our significantly different results provide a complementary picture to
Dudine et al. (2006) and Antoniou and Fiocco (2019), which can contribute to the analysis of
dynamic strategic interactions in storable good markets. In a model a` la Dudine et al. (2006)
with time-dependent buyer valuations, Berbeglia et al. (2019) characterize the optimal prean-
nounced pricing policy and the optimal contingent pricing policy for a monopolistic retailer
that sells indivisible items either to a finite number of buyers with unit demand or to a sin-
gle buyer with arbitrary demand per period. Hendel et al. (2014) study non-linear pricing of
storable goods and find cyclical patterns in prices and sales. Heterogeneity in consumers’ abil-
ity to store makes larger bundles more likely to be on sale. Incorporating consumer storage
into Su’s (2007) analysis of a seller’s optimal dynamic strategy vis-a`-vis strategic buyers, Su
(2010) shows that the seller may either charge a constant fixed price or offer periodic price pro-
motions at predictable time intervals. Hendel and Nevo (2013) theoretically and empirically
investigate the intertemporal price discrimination incentives of a firm that faces consumers
with heterogeneous storage abilities. In equilibrium, the price pattern exhibits temporary re-
ductions that allow the firm to discriminate among consumers.
The effects of competition in markets for storable goods have been studied as well. In a
Cournot duopoly framework, Anton and Das Varma (2005) show that firms compete for con-
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sumer storage. The equilibrium price sequence is increasing and prices are higher with respect
to the case where storage is unfeasible. In a differentiated good market with price competition,
Guo and Villas-Boas (2007) find that preference heterogeneity leads to differential consumer
storage propensity, which exacerbates future price competition and may remove consumer
storage in equilibrium.5 Nava and Schiraldi (2014) study the impact of consumer storage on
the firms’ incentives to promote periodic price reductions in order to sustain collusion.
Our paper can also contribute to the voluminous literature on durable goods. In Section 8,
we contrast the Coase problem that emerges with durable goods and our mechanism that ap-
plies to storable goods. A recent relevant contribution by Ortner (2017) shows that in a durable
good market stochastic costs introduce an option value of delaying trade, which restores the
monopolist’s power to extract some rents if the consumers’ valuations are discrete. As in our
setting an increase in production costs undermines the firm’s commitment ability, our results
tend to go in the opposite direction to Ortner (2017). This provides further corroboration for the
different nature of the issue at hand. Analyzing the profit maximization problem of a durable
good monopolist, Board (2008) explores the case where incoming demand evolves over time,
and Garrett (2016) considers buyers arriving over time, whose valuations for the good vary
stochastically. In a competitive dynamic market for durable goods with two incumbent sell-
ers and potential entrants, Anton et al. (2014) investigate the equilibrium capacity choices
and pricing strategies when capacities are chosen before competition takes place. Nava and
Schiraldi (2019) show that selling multiple varieties of a durable good allows the monopolist
to recoup some of its market power. The commitment issue of a durable good monopolist
has also been addressed from a mechanism design perspective. In a setting where a seller
of a durable good faces a privately informed buyer, Doval and Skreta (2019) characterize the
revenue-maximizing equilibrium when the seller cannot commit to the mechanism offered to
the buyer in the case of no trade.
Structure of the paper The rest of the paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 sets out the formal
model. Section 3 considers the static solution to the firm’s problem. Sections 4 and 5 charac-
terize the firm’s equilibrium pricing policy under full and limited commitment, respectively.
Section 6 is devoted to price comparisons between the two commitment regimes. Section 7
conducts a welfare analysis. Section 8 discusses the robustness of the results and examines
various possible extensions. Section 9 concludes and provides some empirical and policy im-
plications of our results. All formal proofs are collected in the Appendix. Additional formal
results and associated proofs are relegated to the Supplementary Appendix.
2 The model
Setting
Consumers We consider a two-period market for a storable good characterized by a (contin-
uously differentiable) demand D (pτ) in period τ ∈ {1, 2}, which decreases with the price pτ,
5When exploring competition among firms (Section 8), we discuss how our paper relates to Anton and Das
Varma (2005) and Guo and Villas-Boas (2007).
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i.e., D′ (pτ) < 0. For the sake of simplicity, we assume no discounting on the second period.
In Section 8, we allow for a more general discount factor. Consumers can store some units of
the good in the first period for consumption in the second period at a unit cost sc ≥ 0. We refer
to Section 8 for an extension to convex consumer storage costs. Competitive arbitrageurs can
also engage in storage activities. Following Dudine et al. (2006), the consumer storage demand
writes as
Ds (p1) =

D (p1 + sc) if p1 + sc < p2
[0,D (p1 + sc)] if p1 + sc = p2
0 if p1 + sc > p2
. (1)
For p1 + sc < p2, the first period price augmented by the consumer storage cost is lower than
the second period price, which implies that consumers prefer to store in the first period the
entire quantity consumed in the second period. For p1 + sc = p2, consumers are indifferent
between storing the good and waiting until the second period to purchase it. Hence, they
are willing to store any quantity between zero and consumption in the second period. For
p1 + sc > p2, consumers do not wish to store any quantity. As will be shown in the subsequent
analysis, the last two cases are the only relevant outcomes in equilibrium. Throughout the
paper, we refer to p1+ sc ≥ p2 as the storability (no-arbitrage) constraint, which becomes binding
for p1 + sc = p2.
Firm Amonopolistic firm incurs a (constant) unit production cost cτ in period τ ∈ {1, 2}. The
unit cost is c1 in the first period and c2 in the second period, where ∆c ≡ c2 − c1 denotes the
intertemporal cost variation. As will become clear in the sequel, we focus on the case where
production costs rise over time, i.e., ∆c > 0. In the baseline model, production costs vary
deterministically. This assumption captures in a simple and tractable manner some features of
production costs in retail storable goodmarkets, where prices for primary commodities (which
affect the retail costs) are strongly correlated over time (e.g., Deaton and Laroque 1996). In
Section 8, we show the validity of our analysis in the presence of stochastic costs and discuss
the implications of introducing cost uncertainty.
The firm’s aggregate profits are Π ≡ Π1 + Π2, where
Π1 = (p1 − c1) [D (p1) + Ds (p1)] (2)
and
Π2 = (p2 − c2) [D (p2)− Ds (p1)] (3)
denote the profits in the first and second period, respectively. Consumer storage inflates the
demand faced by the firm in the first period but depresses it in the second period, because
consumers resort to the quantity stored in the first period.
The firm’s profits Πτ in period τ satisfy the following standard assumption.
Assumption 1 Π′′τ (pτ) < 0, τ ∈ {1, 2}.
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Assumption 1 states that the firm’s profits in each period must be concave in prices, which
ensures that the second-order conditions for profit maximization are fulfilled.
Timing and equilibrium concept
Each period of the game includes the following two stages.
(I) The firm determines the price for the good.
(II) Consumers purchase a quantity of the good and consumption takes place.
Under full commitment, the firm is able to specify at the outset of the game the pricing
policy that maximizes the ex ante aggregate profits. Under limited commitment, the price in
each period is sequentially optimal and maximizes the firm’s continuation profits, namely, it
arises as the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game.
3 Static solution
When consumer storage is not feasible, the firm’s problem reduces to the static monopoly
problem in each period τ ∈ {1, 2}, which is given by
max
pτ
(pτ − cτ)D (pτ) . (4)
It is helpful for our analysis to consider the following auxiliary function
φτ(pτ) ≡ D (pτ) + (pτ − cτ)D
′ (pτ) . (5)
This represents the left-hand side of the first-order condition for the static monopoly problem
in period τ. The equilibrium static monopoly price is pmτ = cτ −
D(pmτ )
D′(pmτ )
. We define µmτ ≡
pmτ − cτ =
pmτ
εpmτ
as the price-cost static monopoly markup in period τ, where εpmτ ≡ −
D′(pmτ )p
m
τ
D(pmτ )
is
the demand elasticity evaluated at pmτ . The difference in the static monopoly markups between
the two periods is ∆µm ≡ µm2 − µ
m
1 . Note that ∆µ
m can be interpreted as a measure of cost
pass-through, namely, the rate at which a cost change is passed on to consumers. The cost
pass-through rate is lower (higher) than 1 if and only if ∆µm < (>) 0. The magnitude of
the cost pass-through rate is related to the curvature of demand (e.g., Bulow and Pfleiderer
1983; Fabinger and Weyl 2012). Specifically, the cost pass-through rate is lower (higher) than
1 if and only if demand is log-concave (log-convex). Adopting the terminology of Rochet and
Tirole (2011), a log-concave demand (e.g., linear) leads to “cost absorption”, while a log-convex
demand (e.g., iso-elastic) generates “cost amplification”.6 In Section 9, we discuss our results
in the light of the empirical observations about the cost pass-through.
When storage is feasible, it follows from the consumer storage demand in (1) that the static
monopoly solution is implementable if and only if pm1 + sc ≥ p
m
2 . This corresponds to the
6Standard computations show that (i) with linear demand D (pτ) = α − βpτ it holds ∆µm = −
∆c
2 < 0; (ii)
with iso-elastic demand D (pτ) = γp
−η
τ it holds ∆µ
m = ∆cη−1 > 0 (η > 1 due to the second-order condition for
profit maximization); (iii) with exponential demand D (pτ) = λe−σpτ it holds ∆µm = 0. We refer to Fabinger and
Weyl (2012) for an accurate taxonomy of demand functions according to the cost pass-through rates in a monopoly
setting.
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following static monopoly feasibility constraint
sc ≥ ∆c+ ∆µ
m, (6)
which requires that the consumer storage cost sc must be sufficiently large in order to remove
storage at the static monopoly prices. Note that a smaller ∆µm relaxes the feasibility constraint
(6). When demand is log-concave (∆µm < 0), the cost pass-through rate is lower than 1 and
therefore a cost increase translates into a relatively smaller price increase, which makes the
feasibility constraint (6) easier to be satisfied.
4 Full commitment
A firm equipped with full commitment powers can credibly announce a price for each period
and adhere to this pricing policy. Formally, the firm sets a price sequence that maximizes the
aggregate profits given by the sum of the first period profits in (2) and the second period profits
in (3). In principle, there exist three pricing options that affect the consumer storage behavior.
The first option for the firm is to set a price sequence such that the first period price augmented
by the consumer storage cost is larger than the second period price, i.e., p1 + sc > p2. The con-
sumer storage demand in (1) vanishes, and in each period the firm’s problem corresponds to
the static monopoly problem described in Section 3. The static monopoly solution is imple-
mentable if and only if the feasibility constraint (6) is fulfilled. The second option for the firm
is to implement a price sequence such that the first period price augmented by the consumer
storage cost coincides with the second period price, i.e., p1 + sc = p2. In this case, the stora-
bility (no-arbitrage) constraint is binding and consumers are indifferent between storing the
good for future consumption and waiting until the second period to purchase it. When pro-
duction costs increase in the second period (∆c > 0), the consumers’ decision to store the entire
demand for the second period can be profitable for the firm, because this allows the concentra-
tion of production in the first period and generates cost savings. The third option at the firm’s
disposal is to set a price sequence such that the first period price augmented by the consumer
storage cost is lower than the second period price, i.e., p1 + sc < p2. Consumers store in the
first period the entire quantity that they are willing to consume in the second period. As this
outcome can be replicated by setting p1 + sc = p2, the third option for the firm is (at least
weakly) dominated by the second option. Hence, we can restrict our attention to the first two
pricing options.
The following proposition characterizes the consumer storage behavior and the price se-
quence in equilibrium when the firm can commit to future prices. The equilibrium outcome
hinges on a number of factors, such as the magnitude of consumer storage costs, the curvature
of demand, and the feasibility of the static monopoly solution.
Proposition 1 Under full commitment,
(i) if sc < min {∆c+ ∆µm,∆c}, consumer storage is Dcss = D (p
cs
1 + sc), and prices are p
cs
1 =
c1 −
D(pcs1 +sc)+φ1(pcs1 )
D′(pcs1 +sc)
and pcs2 = p
cs
1 + sc;
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(iia) if ∆c+∆µm ≤ sc ≤ ∆c, there exists a threshold s
c
c ∈ (∆c+ ∆µ
m,∆c) such that (1) for sc < s
c
c
the outcome in (i) applies, (2) for sc ≥ s
c
c consumer storage is D
m
s = 0, and prices are p
m
1 = c1 + µ
m
1
and pm2 = c2 + µ
m
2 ;
(iib) if, alternatively, ∆c ≤ sc < ∆c+ ∆µm, consumer storage is Dcns = 0, and prices are p
cn
1 =
c1 −
D(pcn1 )+φ2(pcn1 +sc)
D′(pcn1 )
and pcn2 = p
cn
1 + sc;
(iii) if sc ≥ max {∆c+ ∆µm,∆c}, the outcome in (iia-2) applies.
To better appreciate the results in Proposition 1, we disentangle the analysis according
to the sign of ∆µm, which measures the magnitude of the cost pass-through rate in a static
monopoly setting (see Section 3). In Figure 1, panel (a) illustrates the case ∆µm ≤ 0 formalized
in Corollary 1, and panel (b) illustrates the case ∆µm > 0 formalized in Corollary 2.
We start with the case ∆µm ≤ 0, which occurs if and only if demand is (weakly) log-concave
(e.g., linear or exponential). The outcome in point (iia) of Proposition 1 is feasible instead of
the outcome in point (iib).
Corollary 1 Suppose ∆µm ≤ 0. Then, under full commitment,
(i) if sc < s
c
c, consumer storage is D
cs
s = D (p
cs
1 + sc), and prices are p
cs
1 and p
cs
2 = p
cs
1 + sc;
(ii) if sc ≥ s
c
c, consumer storage is D
m
s = 0, and prices are p
m
1 and p
m
2 .
Prices exhibit the following features: (a)
∂pcs1
∂sc
< 0 for D′′ (·) < D̂′′, (b)
∂pcs2
∂sc
> 0. Moreover, it holds
pm1 ≥ p
cs
1 for D
′′ (·) < D̂′′, where the equality follows if and only if sc = 0.
Point (i) of Corollary 1 indicates that, when the consumer storage cost is relatively small,
i.e., sc < s
c
c, the firm finds it optimal to commit to a price sequence that induces consumers
to store the entire quantity for the second period. Therefore, the firm shuts down in the sec-
ond period. Given that the storability constraint is binding, i.e., pcs2 = p
cs
1 + sc, consumers
are indeed indifferent about storing. However, any outcome that departs from full storage
is not sustainable in equilibrium, because the firm could slightly reduce the first period price
and stimulate full storage, which yields a discontinuous increase in profits associated with
cost savings. Note from panel (a) of Figure 1 that, for ∆c + ∆µm ≤ sc ≤ ∆c, the firm can
choose between allowing consumer storage and implementing the static monopoly solution
(the feasibility constraint (6) is satisfied).7 The firm’s profits in the presence of consumer stor-
age decrease with storage costs because consumers are more reluctant to store, but the static
monopoly profits do not change. As formally shown in the proof of Proposition 1 in the Ap-
pendix, there exists a unique threshold scc ∈ (∆c+ ∆µ
m,∆c) such that the firm prefers to allow
consumer storage if and only if sc < s
c
c. The threshold s
c
c increases with ∆c, i.e.,
∂scc
∂∆c > 0 (for
a given c1). A larger cost increase leads to lower static monopoly profits but does not affect
the profits in the presence of consumer storage. Hence, the firm is more likely to promote con-
sumer storage in response to a larger cost increase that makes production more convenient in
the first period. For sc ≥ s
c
c, the firm sets the static monopoly prices and consumers abstain
from storing, as point (ii) of Corollary 1 establishes.8
7For the sake of exposition, in Figure 1 the storing outcome is depicted as feasible only for sc ≤ ∆c. When the
additional price that consumers are willing to pay in the second period exceeds the additional production cost, i.e.,
sc > ∆c, consumer storage is clearly detrimental to the firm.
8When production costs decrease over time (∆c < 0), the static monopoly solution is implementable irrespective
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0 sc
(a) ∆µm ≤ 0 (Corollary 1)
feasible
∆c+ ∆µm
feasible
∆c
equilibrium
s¯cc
Dcss = D(p
cs
1 + sc) and p
cs
1 , p
cs
2
Dcns = 0 and p
cn
1 , p
cn
2
Dms = 0 and p
m
1 , p
m
2
0 sc
(b) ∆µm > 0 (Corollary 2)
feasible
∆c+ ∆µm
feasible
∆c
equilibrium
Figure 1: Full commitment (Proposition 1)
Panel (a) of Figure 2 illustrates the equilibrium consumer storage and price sequence as a
function of sc, for the example of linear demand. Note that they exhibit a discontinuity at s
c
c,
where the firm is indifferent between allowing consumer storage and implementing the static
monopoly solution. Clearly, consumer storage decreases with sc, because consumers are more
reluctant to store. When consumer storage is costless, i.e., sc = 0, the equilibrium price is the
same in the two periods, i.e., pcs1 = p
cs
2 , and coincides with the first period static monopoly
price pm1 . Consumers are so eager to store that the firm cannot discriminate between the two
periods and faces twice the same demand in the first period. If sc increases, the storing price
pcs1 declines in order to incentivize consumer storage. According to Corollary 1, this is the case
when demand is not too convex.9 The price pattern is non-monotonic with respect to sc in the
first period. This holds in the second period as well, especially when the second period cost is
not too large.
Now, we turn to the case ∆µm > 0, which occurs if and only if demand is log-convex (e.g.,
iso-elastic). The results are formalized in the following corollary and illustrated in panel (b) of
Figure 1. The outcome in point (iib) of Proposition 1 is feasible instead of the outcome in point
(iia).
Corollary 2 Suppose ∆µm > 0. Then, under full commitment,
(i) if sc < ∆c, consumer storage is D
cs
s = D (p
cs
1 + sc), and prices are p
cs
1 and p
cs
2 = p
cs
1 + sc;
(ii) if ∆c ≤ sc < ∆c+ ∆µm, consumer storage is Dcns = 0, and prices are p
cn
1 and p
cn
2 = p
cn
1 + sc;
(iii) if sc ≥ ∆c+ ∆µm, consumer storage is Dms = 0, and prices are p
m
1 and p
m
2 .
Prices exhibit the following features: (a)
∂pcs1
∂sc
> 0 for D′′ (·) > D̂′′, (b)
∂pcn1
∂sc
< 0, (c)
∂pcs2
∂sc
> 0, (d)
∂pcn2
∂sc
> 0. Moreover, it holds (e) pcs1 ≥ p
m
1 for D
′′ (·) > D̂′′, where the equality follows if and only if
sc = 0, (f) pcn1 > p
m
1 , (g) p
m
2 > p
cn
2 > p
cs
2 .
of the consumer storage costs (∆c < 0 implies pm1 > p
m
2 and makes the feasibility constraint (6) satisfied). In this
case, the static monopoly solution trivially applies, because the preferences of the firm and consumers are aligned
against consumer storage.
9It follows from Section 3 that this is consistent with the case ∆µm ≤ 0. To understand why, note that ∆µm ≤ 0
if and only if
D(pm2 )
D(pm1 )
≤
D′(pm2 )
D′(pm1 )
. As the left-hand side is lower than 1 (∆c > 0 implies pm2 > p
m
1 ), a sufficient condition
is that demand is (weakly) concave. By continuity, this holds as long as demand is not too convex.
11
sc
Ds
s¯cc
(a) ∆µm ≤ 0
(linear demand)
(b) ∆µm > 0
(iso-elastic demand)
scs¯cc
pcs2
pcs1
pm2
pm1
sc
Ds
∆c sc∆c+ ∆µm∆c
pm2
pcs2
pcn2
pm1
pcs1
pcn1
Figure 2: Equilibrium consumer storage and price patterns under full commitment
Point (i) of Corollary 2 shows that, as in point (i) of Corollary 1, when the consumer storage
cost is small enough, i.e., sc < ∆c, the full storage outcome applies. A comparison between
panels (a) and (b) in Figure 1 reveals that for ∆µm > 0 consumer storage is promoted as long
as the additional price that consumers are willing to pay in the second period is lower than
the additional production cost (sc < ∆c). As indicated in point (ii) of Corollary 2 and illus-
trated in panel (b) of Figure 1, there exists an interval for sc, i.e., ∆c ≤ sc < ∆c+ ∆µm, where
consumer storage is profit detrimental (∆c ≤ sc) but the static monopoly solution is not imple-
mentable (the feasibility constraint (6) fails to hold). The firm must resort to prices distorted
from the static monopoly level in order to remove consumer storage. Note from points (i) and
(ii) that the storability constraint is binding and therefore consumers are indifferent about stor-
ing. Contrary to the outcome in point (i), consumer storage does not take place in the outcome
in point (ii). As consumer storage is profit detrimental (∆c ≤ sc), the firm could slightly in-
crease the first period price and fully remove consumer storage, which yields a discontinuous
increase in profits. Clearly, the firm selects the static monopoly prices if and only if they are
feasible, i.e., sc ≥ ∆c+ ∆µm, as point (iii) of Corollary 2 indicates.
Panel (b) of Figure 2 illustrates the equilibrium consumer storage and price sequence as a
function of sc, for the example of iso-elastic demand. Note that they are now continuous func-
tions. An inspection of panels (a) and (b) of Figure 2 shows that for ∆µm > 0 the first period
price pcs1 is distorted above (rather than below) the static monopoly level and increases (rather
than decreases) with sc. According to Corollary 2, this holds when demand is sufficiently con-
vex.10 To appreciate the rationale for this result, it is important to realize that, with convex
10It follows from Section 3 that this is consistent with the case ∆µm > 0. To understand why, note that ∆µm > 0
if and only if
D(pm2 )
D(pm1 )
>
D′(pm2 )
D′(pm1 )
. As the left-hand side is lower than 1 (∆c > 0 implies pm2 > p
m
1 ), this condition holds
when demand is sufficiently convex.
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demand, an increase in sc generates two opposite effects. On the one hand, a higher sc reduces
the consumer storage demand, which calls for a price reduction in order to stimulate consumer
storage (as with concave demand). On the other hand, a higher sc mitigates the demand reduc-
tion associated with a price increase, because it makes the consumer storage demand flatter.
This generates an incentive for a price increase. When demand is sufficiently convex, the latter
effect dominates the former effect, and the first period price pcs1 increases with sc.
The no-storing prices pcn1 and p
cn
2 lie between the static monopoly prices p
m
1 and p
m
2 . To
deter consumer storage, the firm distorts the price upward in the first period and downward
in the second period compared to the static monopoly level. Contrary to pcs1 , the no-storing
price pcn1 decreases with sc. When storage becomes more costly for consumers, the firm can
alleviate the price distortion from the static monopoly level to prevent consumer storage. The
price sequence is non-monotonic with respect to sc in the first period, but monotonically in-
creases with sc in the second period (due to the binding storability constraint) and achieves its
maximum at the static monopoly price.
5 Limited commitment
We now investigate the situation where the firm is unable to commit to future prices. After
the second period has commenced, the firm succumbs to the temptation to revise its price in
a sequentially optimal manner. We know from point (i) of Proposition 1 that, when consumer
storage costs are small enough, a firm with full commitment powers finds it optimal to an-
nounce a price sequence that induces consumers to store the entire future demand. Moreover,
as point (iib) of Proposition 1 indicates, with log-convex demand and intermediate consumer
storage costs, the firm prefers to commit to a price sequence such that the first period price is
above while the second period price is below the static monopoly level, which fully removes
consumer storage (see Corollary 2). These pricing policies cannot be implemented when the
firm lacks the ability to commit to future prices. Specifically, in the first case, after consumers
stored in the first period the entire second period demand at the announced prices, the firm
has an incentive to decrease the second period price below the announced level in order to
promote sales in the second period as well. In the second case, if consumers did not store
in the first period, the firm’s best response is to increase the second period price above the
announced level up to the static monopoly price. Anticipating the firm’s opportunistic behav-
ior, consumers modify their storage strategies, and the full commitment solution is no longer
achievable.
Using (2) and (3), the firm’s maximization problem can be written as
max
p1
(p1 − c1) [D (p1) + Ds (p1)] + (p2 − c2) [D (p2)− Ds (p1)] (7)
subject to the following constraint of sequential optimality
p2 (Ds (p1)) ≡ argmax
p˜2
( p˜2 − c2) [D ( p˜2)− Ds (p1)] . (8)
As under full commitment, the firm can resort to three pricing options. First, the firm may
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select a pricing policy such that consumer storage does not occur, i.e., p1 + sc > p2. This
leads to the static monopoly prices, provided that the feasibility constraint (6) is satisfied. The
second pricing option is to make consumers indifferent between storing in the first period and
purchasing in the second period, i.e., p1 + sc = p2. Differently from full commitment, the firm
cannot freely manipulate the equilibrium storage level, which is dictated by the constraint of
sequential optimality (8). The third pricing option for the firm is p1 + sc < p2, which induces
full consumer storage. Yet, this pricing policy is not implementable because the firm succumbs
to the temptation to reduce the price in the second period in order to stimulate its sales.11
Intuitively, the firm faces the following trade-off. A lower price in the first period encour-
ages consumer storage, which improves the firm’s cost efficiency in the presence of cost in-
creases over time. However, the firm’s profit margin deteriorates. Despite this basic trade-off,
things are far from being trivial. As under full commitment, the equilibrium outcome hinges
on a number of factors, such as the magnitude of consumer storage costs, the curvature of
demand, and the feasibility of the static monopoly solution. Sequential optimality imposes an
additional relevant constraint. The following proposition characterizes the consumer storage
behavior and the price sequence in equilibrium when the firm cannot commit to future prices.
Proposition 2 Under limited commitment,
(i) if sc < min {∆c+ ∆µm, s˜∗c}, consumer storage is D
∗s
s = φ2 (p
∗s
1 + sc), and prices are p
∗s
1 =
c1 −
D(p∗s1 )+φ2(p∗s1 +sc)+(∆c−sc)φ′2(p∗s1 +sc)
D′(p∗s1 )
and p∗s2 = p
∗s
1 + sc;
(iia) if ∆c+ ∆µm ≤ sc ≤ s˜∗c , there exists a threshold s
∗
c ∈ (∆c+ ∆µ
m, s˜∗c ) such that (1) for sc < s
∗
c
the outcome in (i) applies, (2) for sc ≥ s
∗
c consumer storage is D
m
s = 0, and prices are p
m
1 = c1 + µ
m
1
and pm2 = c2 + µ
m
2 ;
(iib) if, alternatively, s˜∗c ≤ sc < ∆c+ ∆µ
m, consumer storage is D∗ns = 0, and prices are p
∗n
1 =
p∗n2 − sc and p
∗n
2 = p
m
2 ;
(iii) if sc ≥ max {∆c+ ∆µm, s˜∗c}, the outcome in (iia-2) applies.
In line with the analysis of full commitment in Section 4, we identify two main cases. In
Figure 3, panel (a) illustrates the case ∆c + ∆µm ≤ s˜∗c formalized in Corollary 3, and panel
(b) illustrates the case ∆c + ∆µm > s˜∗c formalized in Corollary 4. As shown in the proof of
Proposition 2 in the Appendix, the threshold s˜∗c represents the highest value for sc such that
consumer storage is feasible.
We start with the case ∆c + ∆µm ≤ s˜∗c , which implies that the outcome in point (iia) of
Proposition 2 is feasible instead of the outcome in point (iib). A necessary condition is that
∆µm ≤ 0, namely, demand is (weakly) log-concave.12 For instance, this case applies with
linear demand.
Corollary 3 Suppose ∆c+ ∆µm ≤ s˜∗c . Then, under limited commitment,
(i) if sc < s
∗
c , consumer storage is D
∗s
s = φ2 (p
∗s
1 + sc), and prices are p
∗s
1 and p
∗s
2 = p
∗s
1 + sc;
(ii) if sc ≥ s
∗
c , consumer storage is D
m
s = 0, and prices are p
m
1 and p
m
2 .
11We focus on the plausible situation where the cost increase is not so pronounced as to make production ex post
unprofitable in the second period. When the full commitment price with consumer storage is below the costs in
the second period, the full commitment storing outcome can be trivially replicated under limited commitment.
12We refer to the proof of Proposition 2 in the Appendix for technical details.
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Figure 3: Limited commitment (Proposition 2)
Prices exhibit the following features: (a)
∂p∗s1
∂sc
= 0 for D′′ (·) = 0, (b)
∂p∗s2
∂sc
> 0. Moreover, it holds
(c) pm1 > p
∗s
1 for D
′′ (·) = 0, (d) pm2 > p
∗s
2 .
Point (i) of Corollary 3 shows that, if the consumer storage cost is sufficiently small, i.e.,
sc < s
∗
c , consumers partially store in the first period the quantity demanded in the second
period. As the storability constraint is binding, i.e., p∗s2 = p
∗s
1 + sc, consumers are indeed in-
different about storing. Contrary to the case of full commitment, the equilibrium storage level
is now established by the sequential optimality constraint. Under limited commitment, the
firm can only resort to the first period price to promote consumer storage in anticipation of
higher future costs. Consumers realize that, after storing in the first period the entire quantity
that they are willing to consume in the second period at the announced prices, the firm will
invariably succumb to the temptation to decrease the price in the second period below the an-
nounced level in order to stimulate its sales. This mitigates the consumers’ storage incentives,
and the firm can only induce partial storing of future demand. As illustrated in panel (a) of
Figure 3, for ∆c + ∆µm ≤ sc ≤ s˜∗c , the firm can choose between allowing consumer storage
and implementing the static monopoly solution (the feasibility constraint (6) is satisfied). The
firm’s profits in the presence of consumer storage decrease with storage costs while the static
monopoly profits are unaffected. As formally shown in the proof of Proposition 2 in the Ap-
pendix, there exists a unique threshold s∗c ∈ (∆c+ ∆µ
m, s˜∗c ) such that for sc < s
∗
c the storing
option is profit superior. For sc ≥ s
∗
c , the firm sets the static monopoly prices and consumers
abstain from storing, as point (ii) of Corollary 3 indicates.
Panel (a) of Figure 4 illustrates the equilibrium consumer storage and price sequence as
a function of sc, for the example of linear demand. Similarly to the case of full commitment,
they are discontinuous at s∗c . The first period price p
∗s
1 is independent of sc, which is, however,
an artifact of the linear demand specification. To attract consumer storage, p∗s1 is distorted
below pm1 . A more general result is that the second period price p
∗s
2 is now unambiguously
lower than pm2 . The firm’s lack of commitment removes the possibility of a second period price
above the static monopoly level, because the firm would have an incentive to reduce this price
irrespective of the magnitude of consumer storage.
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Figure 4: Equilibrium consumer storage and price patterns under limited commitment
Now, we consider the case ∆c+ ∆µm > s˜∗c , which is formalized in the following corollary
and illustrated in panel (b) of Figure 3. The outcome in point (iib) of Proposition 2 is feasible
instead of the outcome in point (iia). This case applies if ∆µm > 0, namely, demand is log-
convex (e.g., iso-elastic).
Corollary 4 Suppose ∆c+ ∆µm > s˜∗c . Then, under limited commitment,
(i) if sc < s˜
∗
c , consumer storage is D
∗s
s = φ2 (p
∗s
1 + sc), and prices are p
∗s
1 and p
∗s
2 = p
∗s
1 + sc;
(ii) if s˜∗c ≤ sc < ∆c + ∆µ
m, consumer storage is D∗ns = 0, and prices are p
∗n
1 = p
∗n
2 − sc and
p∗n2 = p
m
2 ;
(iii) if sc ≥ ∆c+ ∆µm, consumer storage is Dms = 0, and prices are p
m
1 and p
m
2 .
Prices exhibit the following features: (a)
∂p∗n1
∂sc
< 0, (b)
∂p∗s2
∂sc
> 0. Moreover, it holds (c) p∗n1 > p
m
1 ,
(d) pm2 > p
∗s
2 .
Point (i) of Corollary 4 indicates that, as in point (i) of Corollary 3, consumer storage occurs
in equilibrium for sufficiently small consumer storage costs. A comparison between panels (a)
and (b) of Figure 3 shows that the firm now prefers to induce consumer storage as long as it
is feasible, i.e., sc < s˜
∗
c . As point (ii) of Corollary 4 reveals, for intermediate consumer storage
costs, i.e., s˜∗c ≤ sc < ∆c+ ∆µ
m, consumer storage is unfeasible but the firm cannot implement
the static monopoly solution (the feasibility constraint (6) is violated). Although consumers
are indeed indifferent about storing (the storability constraint is binding), we find that no stor-
age takes place in equilibrium. This resembles the full commitment outcome in point (ii) of
Corollary 2 illustrated in panel (b) of Figure 1. However, under limited commitment, the first
period no-storing price p∗n1 is distorted above the static monopoly level, whereas second pe-
riod no-storing price p∗n2 coincides with the static monopoly level, which constitutes the firm’s
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best response to the absence of consumer storage. As point (iii) of Corollary 4 indicates, the
static monopoly solution is implemented if and only if it is available, i.e., sc ≥ ∆c+ ∆µm.
Panel (b) of Figure 4 illustrates the equilibrium consumer storage and price sequence as
a function of sc, for the example of iso-elastic demand. As under full commitment in panel
(b) of Figure 2, they are continuous functions. The depicted pattern of first period price p∗s1
does not hold generally, because p∗s1 varies with sc according to the demand curvature. The
first period no-storing price p∗n1 = p
m
2 − sc lies above the static monopoly level and decreases
linearly with sc (due to the binding storability constraint). Hence, the first period pricing policy
is typically non-monotonic. The second period pricing policy monotonically increases with sc
and coincides with the static monopoly level when consumer storage is no longer feasible.
6 Price comparisons
Equipped with the results of the previous sections, we are now in a position to compare the
equilibrium prices under the two commitment regimes. For the sake of convenience, we define
DN2 (p1) ≡ D (p1 + sc)− Ds (p1) as the second period demand net of consumer storage.
Proposition 3 Suppose sc < s
l
c, where s
l
c is defined by (A14) in the Appendix. Then, in each period
the price under limited commitment is lower than the price under full commitment, i.e., p∗sτ < p
cs
τ ,
τ ∈ {1, 2}, if and only if
∂DN2 (p∗s1 )
∂p1
> 0.
Proposition 3 shows that, under certain circumstances, the firm’s lack of commitment leads
to lower prices in each period. Given that production costs rise in the second period and a firm
with limited commitment powers only cares about its continuation profits after the second pe-
riod starts, one might be tempted to believe that the firm ends up charging excessively high
prices, at least in the second period. Indeed, we show that an increase in production costs can
translate into lower prices in each period under limited commitment. To appreciate the ratio-
nale for this result as substantiated in the introduction, recall from Proposition 1 that the full
commitment price sequence in the presence of consumer storage is such that consumers store
the entire second period demand, and therefore the firm shuts down in the second period.
However, as shown in Section 5, this pricing policy is not sequentially optimal, because the
firm succumbs to the temptation to charge a lower price than under full commitment in order
to serve the market in the second period. As stated in Proposition 3, suppose that consumer
storage costs are sufficiently small, i.e., sc < s
l
c, where s
l
c is the threshold for sc below which
consumer storage occurs irrespective of the firm’s commitment powers, which implies that the
storability constraint is binding. Given that slc ≤ ∆c, the additional cost ∆c of producing in the
second period exceeds the additional price sc that consumers are willing to pay in the second
period. Hence, the firm has an ex ante incentive to discourage purchases in the second period.
To this aim, the only instrument to which the firm can resort under limited commitment is
the price in the first period. A manipulation of the first period price generates two opposite
effects. A lower p1 stimulates consumer storage Ds (p1). Ceteris paribus, this reduces produc-
tion and sales in the second period, and allows the firm to enjoy cost savings. However, given
the binding storability constraint, a lower p1 translates into a lower p2 = p1+ sc, which inflates
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the second period gross demand D (p1 + sc) and hinders the firm’s cost efficiency. When the
second period demand net of consumer storage is upward sloping, i.e.,
∂DN2
∂p1
> 0, the increase
in consumer storage associated with a lower first period price more than compensates the in-
crease in the second period gross demand. A reduction in the first period price leads to lower
production and sales in the second period, which alleviates the firm’s loss from the lack of
commitment. As formally shown in the proof of Proposition 3 in the Appendix, the sign of the
slope of the second period residual demand crucially depends on the curvature of demand. It
turns out that the second period residual demand is upward sloping as long as the demand
function is not too convex. Widely-used demand specifications that satisfy this condition are
linear, exponential and, under some circumstances, iso-elastic demand functions.13 Given that
the second period price declines as well due to the binding storability constraint, a firm with
limited commitment powers charges lower prices than under full commitment in each period,
i.e., p∗sτ < p
cs
τ , τ ∈ {1, 2}. For illustrative purposes, in the Supplementary Appendix (Section
7) we characterize the equilibrium price sequence and consumer storage under the two com-
mitment regimes as well as the associated welfare properties in a linear demand framework.
If the second period net demand is downward sloping, i.e.,
∂DN2
∂p1
< 0, the firmmust increase
the first period price in order to reduce the second period net demand. This occurs when the
demand function is significantly convex.14 The reduction in the second period gross demand
arising from a higher first period price exceeds the reduction in consumer storage, which im-
plies that the second period residual demand declines. The firm charges higher prices than
under full commitment in order to reduce production and sales in the second period, which
mitigates the firm’s loss from the lack of commitment. Despite higher prices, consumer stor-
age still occurs in equilibrium. As the storability constraint is binding, consumers are indeed
indifferent about storing, and the equilibrium consumer storage is dictated by the sequential
optimality constraint.
The condition about the slope of the second period residual demand in Proposition 3 can
be formulated in terms of a relationship between the convexity of demand and the firm’s
relative markup in the second period. Following Mra´zova´ and Neary (2017), the convexity
of demand is defined as the elasticity of the slope of demand, which corresponds to r∗s2 ≡
− d logD
′(p2)
d log p2
∣∣∣
p2=p∗s2
= −
p∗s2 D
′′(p∗s2 )
D′(p∗s2 )
if evaluated at the second period equilibrium limited commit-
ment price p∗s2 . The relative markup, or Lerner index, in the second period is equal to the ratio
between the profit margin and the price in equilibrium, i.e.,m∗s2 ≡
p∗s2 −c2
p∗s2
. We find the following
result.
Corollary 5 Suppose sc < s
l
c, where s
l
c is defined by (A14) in the Appendix. Then, in each period
the price under limited commitment is lower than the price under full commitment, i.e., p∗sτ < p
cs
τ ,
τ ∈ {1, 2}, if and only if r∗s2 <
1
m∗s2
.
Corollary 5 provides an alternative condition for the result in Proposition 3, according to
which limited commitment leads to lower prices if and only if the convexity of demand is
13For sufficiently small consumer storage costs, the degree of elasticity of the iso-elastic demand must be high
enough.
14An example is the iso-elastic demand with a sufficiently low degree of elasticity.
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lower than the inverse of the Lerner index in the second period, i.e., r∗s2 <
1
m∗s2
.15 As discussed in
Section 9, the appealing feature of this condition is that it is suitable for an empirical estimation.
The following proposition completes the analysis of the price comparisons between the
two commitment regimes.
Proposition 4 A. Suppose slc ≤ sc < s
h
c , where s
l
c and s
h
c are defined by (A14) and (A15) in the
Appendix. Then, in the first period the price under limited commitment is higher than the price under
full commitment. If ∆µm > 0, the price under limited commitment is also higher in the second period.
B. Suppose sc ≥ shc . Then, in each period the price under limited commitment coincides with the
price under full commitment and corresponds to the static monopoly price.
Proposition 4 delivers results that substantially differ from Proposition 3. Specifically,
Proposition 4A indicates that, for intermediate consumer storage costs, i.e., slc ≤ sc < s
h
c ,
the price in the first period is higher under limited commitment irrespective of the demand
curvature. Although the equilibrium price varies under each commitment regime according
to the parameter constellations, a common rationale for this result can be identified. It follows
from the discussion after Proposition 3 that for sc ≥ slc consumer storage disappears at least
under one commitment regime. In particular, it may occur that under limited commitment
consumer storage is removed but it is profitable under full commitment. Alternatively, un-
der limited commitment consumer storage is either allowed or removed but it is unprofitable
under full commitment. The firm’s lower capability to promote efficient consumer storage un-
der limited commitment implies that the firm charges a first period price higher than under
full commitment at which consumer storage disappears even when it is ex ante profitable. If
consumer storage cannot be prevented despite being ex ante unprofitable, we find that lim-
ited commitment leads to higher prices in both periods.16 As Proposition 4A indicates, with
log-convex demand (∆µm > 0), the second period price is also unambiguously higher under
limited commitment, because the storability constraint is binding under the two commitment
regimes. However, this result may not hold if demand is (weakly) log-concave (∆µm ≤ 0). The
comparison between the second period prices becomes problematic when the static monopoly
prices pm1 and p
m
2 are set under limited commitment while the prices p
cs
1 and p
cs
2 with con-
sumer storage are chosen under full commitment. We know from the feasibility constraint (6)
that pm1 + sc ≥ p
m
2 and from Proposition 1 that p
cs
1 + sc = p
cs
2 . Hence, a higher first period price
under limited commitment does not necessarily imply a higher price in the second period as
well. Given that pcs2 increases with sc (see Corollaries 1 and 2) but p
m
2 is unaffected, there may
exist a threshold for sc above which the second period price is indeed lower under limited
commitment.
15The proof of Corollary 5 directly follows from Proposition 3 and therefore it is omitted. Note from Proposition
2 that, in the presence of consumer storage D∗ss = φ2
(
p∗s1 + sc
)
(where φ (·) is defined by (5)), the Lerner index is
lower than the inverse of the demand elasticity, i.e., m∗s2 <
1
εp∗s2
, differently from the static monopoly.
16This case occurs for sc > ∆c and the binding storability constraint under the two commitment regimes. As
the additional price that consumers are willing to pay in the second period outweighs the additional production
cost, i.e., sc > ∆c, consumer storage is ex ante unprofitable. Hence, a firm with limited commitment powers resorts
to a higher first period price in order to mitigate consumer storage. This translates into a higher second period
price due to the binding storability constraint. We refer to the proof of Proposition 4 in the Appendix for technical
details.
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As Proposition 4B reveals, the firm opts for the static monopoly prices irrespective of its
commitment powers when consumer storage costs are sufficiently large, i.e., sc ≥ shc , where
shc ≥ ∆c + ∆µ
m. Consumer storage is so costly that it renders the static monopoly solution
not only implementable (the feasibility constraint (6) holds) but also optimal under the two
commitment regimes.
It is worth exploring the impact of the cost increase ∆c (for a given c1) on the equilibrium
prices in the presence of consumer storage under the two commitment regimes. This is for-
malized in the following remark.
Remark 1 For a given c1, it holds
(i)
∂pcsτ
∂∆c = 0, τ ∈ {1, 2};
(ii)
∂p∗sτ
∂∆c < 0 if and only if
∂
∂∆c
[
(∆c− sc)
∂DN2 (p∗s1 )
∂p1
]
> 0, τ ∈ {1, 2}.
As Remark 1 indicates, the full commitment price pcsτ is independent of the cost increase ∆c,
because production only takes place in the first period. The relation between the cost increase
∆c and the limited commitment price p∗sτ is more sophisticated. It reflects the impact of ∆c on
the firm’s loss (∆c− sc) from serving the market in the second period weighted by the slope of
the second period net demand function
∂DN2
∂p1
.17 This is the outcome of the trade-off between two
effects. To gain some intuition, note that ∂∂∆c
[
(∆c− sc)
∂DN2
∂p1
]
=
∂DN2
∂p1
+ (∆c− sc)
∂2DN2
∂p1∂∆c
. The first
term captures the direct effect of ∆c, which is equal to the price impact on the second period
net demand, i.e.,
∂DN2
∂p1
. The second term measures the indirect effect of ∆c through the price
channel, which corresponds to the responsiveness of
∂DN2
∂p1
to ∆c, i.e.,
∂2DN2
∂p1∂∆c
, weighted by the
firm’s loss (∆c− sc). As
∂2DN2
∂p1∂∆c
= D′′ (p1 + sc), the trade-off between the two effects crucially
depends on the curvature of demand. First, consider a concave demand, i.e., D′′ (·) < 0. We
know from Proposition 3 and the associated Corollary 5 that the second period net demand
is upward sloping, i.e.,
∂DN2
∂p1
> 0. Hence, the first effect is positive and pushes toward a price
reduction in order to dampen the second period net demand. A higher ∆c induces the firm
to implement a more aggressive pricing policy, which allows saving production costs in the
second period. However, the second effect is negative, i.e.,
∂2DN2
∂p1∂∆c
= D′′ (p1 + sc) < 0. The
reason is that a higher ∆cmitigates the negative slope of the consumer storage function, which
becomes flatter ( ∂
2Ds
∂p1∂∆c
= −
∂2DN2
∂p1∂∆c
> 0). A more rigid consumer storage demand tempers
the reduction in consumer storage associated with a higher price. This creates an incentive
for a price increase. When ∆c is relatively small, the first effect dominates the second effect
due to the small size of the firm’s loss (∆c− sc), and therefore the limited commitment price
decreases with ∆c. For relatively large values of ∆c, the second effect can prevail, and the
limited commitment price increases with ∆c.
Consider now a (weakly) convex demand, i.e., D′′ (·) ≥ 0. We know from Proposition 3
and Corollary 5 that, if demand is not too convex, the first effect is still positive, i.e.,
∂DN2
∂p1
> 0.
The second effect is now (weakly) positive as well, i.e.,
∂2DN2
∂p1∂∆c
= D′′ (p1 + sc) ≥ 0. The idea is
17For the sake of convenience, we focus on the most relevant case where sc < ∆c. However, with log-convex
demand (∆µm > 0), consumer storage may occur under limited commitment even for sc > ∆c (see the proofs of
Propositions 3 and 4 in the Appendix). The result in Remark 1 is unaffected but the explanation should be qualified
accordingly.
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that a higher ∆c steepens the consumer storage demand function ( ∂
2Ds
∂p1∂∆c
= −
∂2DN2
∂p1∂∆c
≤ 0). A
more elastic consumer storage demand exacerbates the reduction in consumer storage associ-
ated with a higher price. This strengthens the incentive for a price reduction. Consequently,
the limited commitment price unambiguously decreases with ∆c. Notably, this result is evoca-
tive of Edgeworth’s paradox that a tax on a monopolist may lead to lower prices (Hotelling
1932). However, the rationale for Edgeworth’s paradox, derived in a static framework with
substitutable goods, hinges on merely analytical conditions (which are not satisfied with linear
demand and cost functions) and significantly differs from the mechanism behind our result.
When demand is sufficiently convex, it follows from Proposition 3 and Corollary 5 that the
first effect becomes negative, i.e.,
∂DN2
∂p1
< 0. Given that the second effect is still positive, the
trade-off between the two effects generates opposite results to those with concave demand.
When ∆c is small enough, the limited commitment price increases with ∆c but the converse
can occur for sufficiently large values of ∆c.
7 Welfare analysis
We now investigate consumer surplus and total welfare associated with the firm’s ability to
commit to future prices. Total welfare is computed as the (unweighted) sum of consumer sur-
plus and the firm’s profits. In the following proposition, we consider the case where consumer
storage costs are relatively small, as in Proposition 3.
Proposition 5 Suppose sc < s
l
c, where s
l
c is defined by (A14) in the Appendix. Then, for
∂DN2 (p∗s1 )
∂p1
> 0,
(i) consumer surplus is higher under limited commitment than under full commitment;
(ii) total welfare is higher under limited commitment than under full commitment if the second
period net demand DN2 (p
∗s
1 ) is small enough.
For
∂DN2 (p∗s1 )
∂p1
≤ 0, consumer surplus and total welfare are lower under limited commitment than
under full commitment.
Proposition 5 characterizes the welfare comparison between the two commitment regimes
when consumer storage costs are sufficiently small so that storage takes place irrespective of
the firm’s commitment powers, i.e., sc < s
l
c. Note that the quantity bought at the unit price
p1 and stored by consumers in the first period is actually consumed in the second period at
the additional unit cost sc. This generates the same consumer surplus as if that quantity had
been bought in the second period at the unit price p1 + sc. Given that for sc < s
l
c consumers
are indifferent about storing under full and limited commitment, i.e., p2 = p1 + sc, consumer
surplus is higher under the commitment regime that generates lower prices, irrespective of
the level of consumer storage. It follows from Proposition 3 that limited commitment increases
consumer surplus if and only if the second period net demand is upward sloping, i.e.,
∂DN2
∂p1
> 0,
which occurs as long as the demand function is not too convex.
The comparison in terms of total welfare between the two commitment regimes differs
from the standard static case of a price change. Intuitively, a lower price under limited com-
mitment raises total welfare because it mitigates the deadweight loss from monopoly power.
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However, limited commitment harms per se the firm’s profits, in addition to the mere price re-
duction. We find that, despite the firm’s loss, limited commitment enhances total welfare if the
second period demand net of consumer storage is small enough. Recall from the discussion
in Section 6 that for sc < s
l
c the additional price sc that consumers are willing to pay is lower
than the additional cost ∆c of producing in the second period (slc ≤ ∆c). This implies that pro-
duction in the second period is socially inefficient. Given that a firm with limited commitment
powers cannot refrain from serving the market in the second period, limited commitment is
total welfare superior if the second period sales are low enough. As formally shown in the
Supplementary Appendix (Section 7), in a linear demand framework, there exists a threshold
for the cost increase ∆c above which limited commitment increases total welfare. The ratio-
nale for this result can be grasped in the light of our analysis so far. It follows from Remark
1 that, with linear demand, under limited commitment the firm lowers its prices in response
to a higher ∆c, which stimulates consumer storage and reduces the second period residual de-
mand. If ∆c is above a certain threshold, the gain in consumer surplus more than compensates
the firm’s loss, and therefore limited commitment enhances total welfare.18 Notably, we find
that the threshold for ∆c declines with the slope of demand. This relaxes the condition for the
total welfare superiority of limited commitment. A more elastic demand leads to lower prices
and higher consumer storage, which reduces the socially inefficient production and sales in the
second period. We know from Proposition 3 that, when the second period residual demand is
downward sloping, prices are higher under limited commitment. As Proposition 5 indicates,
this reduces consumer surplus and, a fortiori, total welfare.
For the sake of completeness, the following remark formalizes the welfare results for larger
values of consumer storage costs, as in Proposition 4.
Remark 2 A. Suppose slc ≤ sc < s
h
c , where s
l
c and s
h
c are defined by (A14) and (A15) in the Appendix.
Then, if ∆µm > 0, consumer surplus and total welfare are lower under limited commitment than under
full commitment.
B. Suppose sc ≥ shc . Then, consumer surplus and total welfare are the same under the two commit-
ment regimes and coincide with the static monopoly level.
The results in Remark 2 are a direct consequence of Proposition 4.19 For intermediate con-
sumer storage costs, i.e., slc ≤ sc < s
h
c , prices are unambiguously higher under limited commit-
ment if demand is log-convex (∆µm > 0), which leads to lower consumer surplus. As the firm’s
profits are also lower, limited commitment is definitely welfare detrimental. When demand is
(weakly) log-concave (∆µm ≤ 0), the first period price is higher under limited commitment,
but no clear-cut result can be derived in the second period. A higher first period price and
lower profits suggest that limited commitment is still welfare detrimental, but a more rigorous
analysis can only be conducted in a more specific setting. As formally shown in the Supple-
mentary Appendix (Section 7), with linear demand, limited commitment reduces consumer
surplus and, a fortiori, total welfare. For sufficiently large consumer storage costs, i.e., sc ≥ shc ,
18The cost increase ∆c cannot be too large in order to guarantee a positive profit margin in the second period. As
discussed in Section 5, throughout the paper we focus on cost increases whose magnitude is not so significant that
the firm’s commitment problem trivially disappears.
19The proof of Remark 2 is therefore omitted.
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the firm implements the static monopoly solution irrespective of its commitment powers, and
therefore the firm’s commitment problem is welfare inconsequential.
8 Robustness and extensions
Firm’s inventories and convex storage costs
Along with consumers, the firm can conduct storage activities by accumulating inventories
for future sales. Intuitively, the amount of the firm’s inventories and consumer storage shall
depend on the relative magnitude of their storage costs, which varies with the industry at
hand. As discussed in the introduction, there exists empirical and anecdotal evidence accord-
ing to which in different markets retailers are more inefficient at storing than consumers and
therefore prefer to delegate storage activities to them (e.g., Blattberg et al. 1981; Pesendorfer
2002).20 For instance, Walmart has over 11,000 stores worldwide that generally face physical
constraints on the storage capacities and prefer to induce consumer storage rather than return
the unsold products to their warehouses. The existence of price differences over time can spur
storage at least by consumers with relatively low opportunity costs. Competitive arbitrageurs
can also engage in storing for speculative purposes, especially in the presence of price volatil-
ity (e.g., Mitraille and Thille 2009, 2014).21 However, in other markets, mainly at the upstream
level, a large firm can incur lower storage costs than its customers. Inventory accumulation re-
duces future production costs and therefore can be the firm’s preferred option. In addition, as
shown by Antoniou and Fiocco (2019) in the context of a growing market, a firm with limited
commitment powers can exhibit strategic incentives to hold inventories in order to credibly
affect its future price. In our setting, consumer storage can still emerge in equilibrium, particu-
larly when convex production costs or capacity constraints prevent the firm from covering the
entire future demand. We refer to the subsequent analysis in Section 8 for extensions of our
model in these directions.
In practice, the firm’s inventories and consumer storage are likely to coexist for reasons
mainly related to limited storage capacities. In line with some relevant literature (e.g., Dudine
et al. 2006), we consider linear storage costs in the baseline model. Yet, consumers may find it
more costly to store an additional unit of the good when their storage is higher. Along these
lines, Hendel et al. (2014) assume that consumers are able to store for free but face a storage
capacity. Alternatively, consumers can be heterogeneous in their unit storage costs. The firm
can also face capacity constraints or increasing marginal storage costs. In the Supplementary
Appendix (Section 2), we extend our analysis to accommodate these features by introducing
convex storage costs. Then, the firm accumulates inventories and promotes consumer storage
for production smoothing purposes. In case of homogeneous consumers, the firm can benefit
from the relatively small consumer storage costs up to some storage level. When consumers
differ in their storage abilities, the firm resorts to the storage activities by the most efficient
20Inventories affect the firms’ taxable profits so that higher inventory accumulation translates into a higher tax
burden. Direct inventory taxation is imposed in some US states (e.g., Kentucky, Louisiana, Texas, and West Vir-
ginia).
21Recent technological advances facilitate these arbitrage operations. For instance, Fulfillment by Amazon allows
small sellers to store their products in Amazon’s fulfillment centers.
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consumers. In a general framework with convex storage costs, we show that, following the
rationale behind the results in the baseline model, a firmwith limited commitment powers has
an incentive to charge lower prices than under full commitment when consumers are more
reluctant to store in anticipation of the firm’s opportunistic behavior in the second period. In
a more specific setting with linear demand and quadratic storage costs, we explicitly derive
the equilibrium prices under the two commitment regimes. We find that limited commitment
leads to lower prices as long as the increase in marginal production costs is not significantly
pronounced. The firm succumbs to the temptation to reduce the second period price below
the full commitment level in order to stimulate its sales, and therefore the firm’s commitment
problem persists.
Uncertainty about production costs
Cost expectations can be formed in a number of relevant industries with some degree of accu-
racy. For instance, systematic empirical evidence about the oil market indicates that crude oil
prices evolve according to a mean reversion pattern (e.g., Anderson et al. 2018; Bessembinder
et al. 1995; Deltas 2008). Following a negative (positive) cost shock, future costs are expected to
be higher (lower) than current costs.22 Nowadays, several central banks around the world, in-
cluding the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England and the European Central Bank, significantly
resort to “forward guidance”, via which they inform the public about the intended future path
of monetary policy. Their purpose is to influence the operators’ expectations about the future
cost of capital (e.g., Dell’Ariccia et al. 2018). More generally, predictions regarding future input
costs (at least in the short run) are available in sectors where commodities can be traded in the
stock markets (e.g., coffee, cereals, corn, oil, and chemicals). In a similar vein, in international
markets the exporters’ forecasts about their future production costs depend on the expected
variations in exchange rates.
Our model can be extended to allow for uncertainty about future production costs. To pre-
serve the relevance of our analysis, we focus on the case where the second period expected
marginal cost is higher than the first period marginal cost. Formal details are provided in the
Supplementary Appendix (Section 3). Under full commitment, for sufficiently small storage
costs, the introduction of cost uncertainty does not crucially affect the firm’s pricing policy,
because the firm induces full storage in the first period and shuts down in the second period.
Under limited commitment, the firm cannot refrain from serving the market in the second pe-
riod, and the associated price will depend on the realization of the cost shock. A stochastic
cost process may yield significant welfare effects. As formally shown in the Supplementary
Appendix (Section 3), the firm’s (second period) profits are convex with respect to the stochas-
tic term that positively affects the cost realization. This suggests that uncertainty about future
costs mitigates the firm’s loss from the lack of commitment. In the light of Waugh’s (1944)
classical result that consumer surplus is convex in prices, we may expect that the variability in
the second period price can benefit consumers as well. In the Supplementary Appendix (Sec-
tion 3), we characterize the condition under which consumer surplus is convex with respect
to the stochastic term. This is satisfied under widely-used demand functions, such as linear,
22This stochastic process resembles the one adopted by Antoniou et al. (2017).
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exponential, and iso-elastic. Hence, cost uncertainty creates a shift in consumer preferences in
favor of limited commitment for a relevant number of cases.
In our model, storage activities can be conducted either by competitive arbitrageurs or
directly by final consumers. Consider a continuum of risk-neutral, profit-maximizing, com-
petitive arbitrageurs (or speculators) that purchase the good at the price p1 from the firm in
the first period and, after incurring the storage cost sc, resell it to final consumers in the sec-
ond period. The presence of arbitrageurs implies that the second period expected price reflects
the first period price augmented by the storage cost, i.e., E [p2] = p1 + sc. Now, suppose that
arbitrageurs do not operate in the market, and final consumers can directly engage in storing
activities. It follows from the convexity of consumer surplus with respect to the stochastic
term that consumers prefer ex ante to buy a unit of the good in the second period at a random
price p2 rather than at a deterministic price equal to E [p2]. Given that storing involves a unit
deterministic price p1 + sc, the condition under which consumers are indifferent about storing
is such that p1 + sc < E [p2]. In this case, the firm must reduce the first period price to a larger
extent in order to stimulate consumer storage, which tends to increase consumer surplus. The
welfare superiority of limited commitment derived in Section 7 can be (ex ante) even more
pronounced in the presence of cost uncertainty.
Convex production costs
Our results can be extended to nonlinear technologies, such as convex production costs. Tech-
nical details are available in the Supplementary Appendix (Section 4). It is well-known that
the firm has an incentive for production smoothing in order to achieve cost efficiency when
production costs differ across periods. A natural extension of our framework is that marginal
costs (at given quantities) rise in the second period. When the magnitude of the cost increase
is significant compared to the consumer storage cost, a firm with full commitment powers
prefers to induce consumer storage in order to smooth production over time. Differently from
the setting with linear costs, consumer storage generally covers only a part of the second pe-
riod demand. Under limited commitment, consumers are more reluctant to store because they
anticipate the firm’s temptation to reduce the second period price below the full commitment
level in order to stimulate its sales. As formally shown in the Supplementary Appendix (Sec-
tion 4), when consumer storage is profitable for the firm, limited commitment leads to lower
prices than full commitment, provided that the second period net demand is positively sloped.
Notably, this holds true despite the fact that lower prices imply higher marginal costs due to
the increase in production. In line with the baseline model, the firm resorts to lower prices
in order to stimulate consumer storage and dampen the second period production and sales,
which mitigates the firm’s loss from the lack of commitment. Hence, the rationale behind our
main results carries over to the presence of convex production costs.
Longer time horizon
Our analysis can be generalized to a time horizon with more than two periods. There are vari-
ous reasons that make a two-period model suitable for our purposes, in addition to its analyti-
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cal tractability. Forecasts about the evolution of costs tend to be accurate only in the short run.
Furthermore, storable goods are subject to depreciation over time and can be generally accu-
mulated only for a limited amount of time. Despite these considerations, the study of a longer
time horizon warrants some attention. To fix ideas, consider a setting with T ≥ 2 periods,
where production costs increase in each period, i.e., ∆cτ ≡ cτ − cτ−1 > 0, τ ∈ {2, ..., T}, and
consumer storage costs are sufficiently small so that storage is profitable in each period irre-
spective of the firm’s commitment powers, which requires sc < ∆cτ.
23 It follows from our anal-
ysis that the storability constraint is binding in each period, i.e., pτ = pτ−1 + sc, τ ∈ {2, ..., T}.
Formally, under full commitment, the firm’s maximization problem is given by
max
p1
(p1 − c1)∑
T
τ=1
D (pτ) s.t. pτ = pτ−1 + sc.
In line with the baseline model, a firm that can fully commit to a price sequence induces con-
sumers to store in the first period the entire quantity consumed in the following periods. This
is because the cost increase ∆cτ from period τ − 1 to period τ exceeds the additional price sc
that consumers are willing to pay.
Under limited commitment, the firm cannot refrain from reducing its prices below the full
commitment level to serve the residual demand. Anticipating the firm’s opportunistic be-
havior, consumers are less inclined to store. Formally, under limited commitment, the firm’s
maximization problem can be written as
max
p1
(p1 − c1)∑
T
τ=1
D (pτ)−∑
T
τ=2
DNτ (pτ)
[
∑
τ
t=2
∆ct − (τ − 1) sc
]
s.t. pτ = pτ−1 + sc,
where DNτ (pτ) ≡ D (pτ) − Ds (pτ−1) + Ds (pτ) constitutes the net demand in period τ ∈
{2, ..., T}, namely, the demand for consumption D (pτ) in period τ, reduced by the consumer
storage Ds (pτ−1) in period τ − 1 and inflated by the consumer storage Ds (pτ) in period τ
(where Ds (pτ) = 0 for τ = T because no storage takes place in the final period). The amount
of consumer storage in each period is determined in equilibrium by the condition of sequential
optimality and the binding storability constraint. Each unit of the net demand DNτ (pτ) in any
future period τ involves a loss equal to ∑τt=2∆ct − (τ − 1) sc, which corresponds to the excess
of the aggregate cost increase from the initial period over the aggregate additional price that
consumers are willing to pay. In line with the baseline model, when the future residual de-
mand is upward sloping, a firm with limited commitment powers sets lower prices in order
to stimulate consumer storage, which reduces future production and sales that occur at higher
costs.24 Notably, a longer sequence of periods with increasing costs aggravates the firm’s loss
from serving the future demand, which magnifies the firm’s incentive for a price reduction.
23A finite horizon setting adequately captures the main features of our framework. In an infinite horizon setting,
even abstracting from the fact that forecasts about future costs are likely to be accurate only in the short run, the
existence of a period where costs are expected to decrease identifies a terminal period, analogously to a finite
horizon setting. We refer to Hendel et al. (2014) and Mitraille and Thille (2016) for insightful investigations in an
infinite horizon model.
24For instance, in a three-period setting with a linear demand of the form D (pτ) = α − βpτ , τ ∈ {1, 2, 3}, the
residual demand increases with the price in the second and third period, i.e.,
∂DN2
∂p1
= D′ (p2)−D
′
s (p1) +D
′
s (p2) =
3β > 0 and
∂DN3
∂p1
= D′ (p3)− D
′
s (p2) = β > 0.
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Therefore, under limited commitment, prices can be lower to a further extent compared to full
commitment as the time horizon becomes longer.
Durable goods
It has been well-established in the literature on durable goods since the seminal contribution
of Coase (1972) that, if a monopolist cannot refrain from price-discriminating over time among
consumers with different valuations of the good, consumers have an incentive to postpone
their purchases in expectation of future better deals. Consistently with the consumers’ be-
liefs, the firm charges lower prices than under full commitment and loses (at least partially) its
monopoly power. With storable goods, the nature of the consumers’ intertemporal incentives
is significantly different. Consumers are willing to store in anticipation of higher future prices,
which implies that the consumers’ behavior is driven by demand anticipation rather than by
demand postponement. The equilibrium price sequence also exhibits relevant differences. It
follows from our analysis that the price comparisons between full and limited commitment
in a storable good market crucially depend on a number of factors, such as the magnitude of
consumer storage costs and the curvature of demand. Conversely, prices for durable goods are
unambiguously lower under limited commitment. Moreover, with higher future costs of pro-
duction and costly consumer storage, the price pattern for storable goods increases over time.
Yet, under limited commitment, prices for durable goods decline across periods. For illustra-
tive purposes, in the Supplementary Appendix (Section 5) we characterize the price sequence
for a durable good monopolist in a stylized two-period framework with linear demand.
In contrast with the case of durable goods, the firm’s commitment problem with storable
goods originates from an (expected) increase in future production costs. To better appreciate
the different implications of the storability vis-a`-vis the durability of a good, it is helpful to
explore the impact of a cost variation on the price behavior of a durable good monopolist. As
formally shown in the Supplementary Appendix (Section 5), the second period price rises in
response to a more pronounced cost increase. The reduction in the price drop from the full
commitment level leads to lower sales in the second period and therefore mitigates the firm’s
commitment problem at the cost of more expensive production. This might be misperceived
as a softer constraint for the firm, which could charge a higher price in the first period in
order to recoup some monopoly power. Indeed, the firm decreases the first period price even
further below the full commitment level to stimulate current purchases and save future costs
of production. Hence, a larger cost increase moves prices in opposite directions. The price rise
in the second period more than compensates the price reduction in the first period, which can
lead to lower consumer surplus. In a market for storable goods, the firm’s price response to
a larger cost increase and the associated welfare effects are substantially different. As shown
in Remark 1, with linear demand, a larger cost increase translates into lower prices in each
period, which definitely enhances consumer surplus but aggravates the firm’s commitment
problem.
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Discount factor
In the baseline model, we consider no discounting on the second period. This assumption
is imposed for the sake of simplicity and our qualitative results carry over to a more general
discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1]. Technical details are provided in the Supplementary Appendix
(Section 6). Naturally, when consumer storage costs are sufficiently small so that storage occurs
in equilibrium, the storability constraint is binding, with implies that the first period price
augmented by the consumer storage cost equals the discounted second period price, i.e., p1 +
sc = δp2. In line with the result in Proposition 3, we find that, for sufficiently small consumer
storage costs, limited commitment leads to lower prices than full commitment if and only if
the second period residual demand is upward sloping, namely, the demand function is not
too convex. The impact of the discount factor δ on equilibrium prices exhibits features of some
interest. As shown in the Supplementary Appendix (Section 6), in a linear demand framework,
equilibrium prices increase with δ under the two commitment regimes. A higher δ makes
consumers more eager to store for future consumption, which allows the firm to charge higher
prices. Remarkably, the price gap between full and limited commitment increases with δ.
A firm with limited commitment powers increases its prices in response to a higher δ less
significantly than under full commitment in order to spur consumer storage and mitigate the
more valuable loss from serving the market in the second period.
Competition
Throughout the analysis, we focus our attention on a single firm in the market. This captures
in a simple and tractable manner the presence of market power. As documented by Besanko
et al. (2005), for many grocery products (including storable goods), retailers can have high
market power in their pricing decisions. Nonetheless, it is worth discussing the impact of
competition among firms on our results in the light of the existing literature. In a two-period
Cournot duopoly setting where consumers engage in storage activities, Anton and Das Varma
(2005) show that firms behave more aggressively to attract consumer storage. In a two-period
differentiated good Bertrand framework, Guo and Villas-Boas (2007) find that the opportunity
of consumer storage exacerbates price competition. When production costs are expected to
increase over time, the firms’ incentives to compete for consumer storage are magnified, which
creates further pressure to cut prices. Therefore, the forces described in our paper complement
those identified by Anton and Das Varma (2005) and Guo and Villas-Boas (2007). Our analysis
suggests that, when consumer storage costs are small enough, the benefits for consumers can
be larger under limited commitment, at least in sufficiently concentrated markets.
9 Concluding remarks: empirical and policy implications
The dynamic interactions between firms and consumers are a relevant issue in many settings,
such as markets for storable goods. In this paper, we characterize a firm’s pricing policy and
the welfare effects associated with the firm’s ability to commit to future prices in a dynamic
storable good market where consumers are willing to store in anticipation of higher future
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prices and production costs evolve over time. When production costs are expected to increase,
we find that, for sufficiently small consumer storage costs, the firm’s lack of commitment gen-
erates lower prices if and only if the future residual demand is upward sloping, namely, the
demand function is not too convex. The firm resorts to lower prices in order to reduce future
production and sales, which mitigates the firm’s loss from the lack of commitment. Despite the
firm’s loss, under certain circumstances, limited commitment can be even total welfare supe-
rior. For intermediate values of consumer storage costs, the firm’s inefficient behavior toward
consumer storage under limited commitment generally leads to higher prices. This reduces
consumer surplus and, a fortiori, total welfare.
Our analysis sheds new light on some empirical regularities about the firms’ pricing be-
havior, especially regarding the patterns of cost pass-through rates. The empirical evidence
indicates that typically cost changes are not fully passed through to prices at the firm’s level.
However, in a static monopoly setting, the log-linear and log-convex demand specifications
usually adopted in the empirical literature (such as exponential and iso-elastic demands) lead
to a cost pass-through rate equal and higher than 1, respectively. We find that, for widely-used
demand functions (including exponential and iso-elastic demands), the cost pass-through rate
is indeed lower than 1, consistently with the empirical evidence.25 Hence, our study provides
theoretical support for the commonly observed incomplete cost pass-through in a setting with
empirically relevant demand specifications, even when the market is relatively concentrated.
Remarkably, our results can also explain the puzzling phenomenon of “perverse” pass-through
rates documented by Froot and Klemperer (1989), according to which a cost increase leads to
lower prices.26 Using a data set with 78 products across 11 categories of storable goods sold
by a major US supermarket chain, Besanko et al. (2005) find that 5.6% of the estimated pass-
through rates are “perverse” (i.e., negative), and this percentage becomes substantially higher
for some items (e.g., more than 30% for toothpaste). In our model, “perverse” pass-through
rates emerge with moderately convex demand, provided that consumer storage costs are small
enough (see Remark 1 in Section 6). As emphasized by Ravn et al. (2010), the main theoret-
ical gap in the existing empirical literature on cost pass-through is the pervasive use of static
demand systems. Our study advocates that the dynamic interactions between firms and con-
sumers and the identification of anticipated and unanticipated future cost shocks should be
incorporated into the econometric estimations of pass-through rates. The rationale for the dy-
namic patterns of pass-through rates provided in our paper is different from— but potentially
complementary to— the idea of Ravn et al. (2010) based on good-specific habit formation, and
lies in the intertemporal incentives associated with storable goods.
Cost variations may also stem from changes in commodity taxation. Miravete et al. (2018)
empirically characterize the tax pass-through rates for alcoholic beverages in Pennsylvania and
show that market power crucially affects government tax revenues. Our analysis suggests that
a dynamic econometric model tends to generate lower estimations of tax pass-through rates
25This follows from the inspection of (A11) in the Appendix for exponential and iso-elastic demands, provided
that consumer storage costs are sufficiently small.
26In the international trade framework of Froot and Klemperer (1989), a foreign firm increases its dollar prices
on exports to the US in response to the dollar appreciation that leads to a reduction in the foreign firm’s costs
expressed in dollars.
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with respect to a static model. This can significantly affect the relationship between commodity
tax rates and government tax revenues, i.e., the Laffer curve, and the corresponding design of
the optimal tax policy. The predictions of our model about the impact of storability on pass-
through rates and firms’ markups lend themselves to an empirical validation.
Our analysis is particularly suitable for industries where cost expectations can be formed
with some degree of accuracy, as discussed in Section 8. A prominent example is provided
by tradable pollution allowances in the European Union. To achieve the overall greenhouse
gas emissions reduction target for 2030, the sectors covered by the EU Emissions Trading Sys-
tem must decrease during Phase IV (2021-2030) their emissions by 43% compared to the levels
in 2005.27 As the total number of emission allowances will decline at an annual rate of 2.2%
from 2021 onwards, the carbon price is expected to increase over time and therefore energy-
intensive firms will incur higher costs. Our analysis suggests that firms operating in markets
for storable goods where demand is moderately convex will reduce their prices over time. To
the extent that inflation affects relatively more input costs, our study establishes new micro-
foundations for the empirical evidence that the rate of inflation can be negatively correlated
with the average markups (e.g., Be´nabou 1992; Banerjee et al. 2001; Banerjee and Russell 2001;
Head et al. 2010). For sectors where costs evolve according to a mean reversion pattern (such
as the oil market), an empirical test of our model is to estimate the relation between cost mean
reversion and price patterns.
Our findings can substantiate the stance of regulators and antitrust authorities on the firms’
adoption of instruments that improve their commitment powers in storable good markets.
A well-known contractual policy that a firm can implement to restore (or approach) the full
commitment outcome is a money-back guarantee — sometimes called “most-favored nation”
clause — which commits the firm to reimburse its customers if the future price falls below
the preannounced level. In markets for durable goods where full commitment leads to higher
prices, these price protection policies harm consumers, and therefore they should be prohib-
ited. However, as shown by Dudine et al. (2006), in markets for storable goods where demand
increases over time, the firm’s lack of commitment is unambiguously welfare detrimental,
which induces a positive evaluation of such contracts that improve the firm’s commitment
ability. Our analysis indicates that a more sophisticated assessment is warranted in relatively
mature markets for storable goods, where demand tends to remain stable but production costs
vary over time. Specifically, when consumer storage costs are relatively small and demand
is not too convex, contractual clauses that enhance the firm’s commitment powers should be
banned, because they reduce consumer surplus and, possibly, total welfare. Otherwise, an-
titrust authorities should approve these policies, which tend to benefit consumers and the
whole economy. For relatively small consumer storage costs, limited commitment leads to
lower prices if and only if the convexity of demand is lower than the inverse of the Lerner
index (see Corollary 5 in Section 6). This condition can be empirically identified in a parsimo-
nious manner by resorting to the concept of “demand manifold” proposed by Mra´zova´ and
Neary (2017), which relates the curvature and the elasticity of demand. Estimates of the de-
27Further details can be found at https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/revision en (last retrieved in Decem-
ber 2019).
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mand manifold and the Lerner index are instrumental to potentially fruitful applications of
our results.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The firm faces the following three pricing options: (I) p1 + sc > p2; (II)
p1 + sc = p2; (III) p1 + sc < p2.
Option (I) p1 + sc > p2. It follows from (1) that Ds (p1) = 0. The firm’s maximization
problem is
max
p1,p2
(p1 − c1)D (p1) + (p2 − c2)D (p2) .
The first-order condition for pτ, τ ∈ {1, 2}, is given by
D (pτ) + (pτ − cτ)D
′ (pτ) = 0, (A1)
which yields the equilibrium static monopoly prices
pm1 = c1 + µ
m
1 and p
m
2 = c2 + µ
m
2 , (A2)
where µmτ ≡ p
m
τ − cτ, τ ∈ {1, 2} (see Section 3). Equilibrium consumer storage is D
m
s = 0. This
solution is implementable if and only if the feasibility constraint (6) holds.
Option (II) p1 + sc = p2. It follows from (1) that Ds (p1) ∈ [0,D (p1 + sc)]. The firm’s
maximization problem is
max
p1
(p1 − c1) [D (p1) + Ds (p1)] + (p1 + sc − c2) [D (p1 + sc)− Ds (p1)] . (A3)
The following two cases emerge:
(IIa) sc ≤ ∆c. As the firm’s profits in the maximand of (A3) increase with Ds (p1), the firm
prefers to induce full consumer storage, i.e., Ds (p1) = D (p1 + sc). The firm’s maximization
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problem reduces to
max
p1
(p1 − c1) [D (p1) + D (p1 + sc)] . (A4)
The first-order condition for p1 is
D (p1) + D (p1 + sc) + (p1 − c1)
[
D′ (p1) + D
′ (p1 + sc)
]
= 0. (A5)
We obtain the equilibrium full commitment storing prices
pcs1 = c1 −
D (pcs1 + sc) + φ1 (p
cs
1 )
D′
(
pcs1 + sc
) and pcs2 = pcs1 + sc, (A6)
where φτ (·) is defined by (5).
(IIb) sc > ∆c. As the firm’s profits in the maximand of (A3) decrease with Ds (p1), the firm
prefers to deter consumer storage, i.e., Ds (p1) = 0. The firm’s maximization problem becomes
max
p1
(p1 − c1)D (p1) + (p1 + sc − c2)D (p1 + sc) .
The first-order condition for p1 is
D (p1) + D (p1 + sc) + (p1 − c1)D
′ (p1) + (p1 + sc − c2)D
′ (p1 + sc) = 0. (A7)
Using (5), we obtain the equilibrium full commitment no-storing prices
pcn1 = c1 −
D (pcn1 ) + φ2 (p
cn
1 + sc)
D′
(
pcn1
) and pcn2 = pcn1 + sc. (A8)
Option (III) p1 + sc < p2. It follows from (1) that Ds (p1) = D (p1 + sc). This yields the
same profits (and effective prices paid by consumers) as in (IIa), and therefore is irrelevant.
We obtain the following results.
(i) Suppose sc < min {∆c+ ∆µm,∆c}. The only relevant option is (IIa), and the equilibrium
prices are described by (A6).
(iia) Suppose ∆c + ∆µm ≤ sc ≤ ∆c. This interval is non-empty if and only if ∆µm ≤ 0.
The relevant options are (I) and (IIa), whose associated profits are Πm and Πcs. It follows
from the feasibility constraint (6) that at the lower bound sc = ∆c+ ∆µm it holds pm2 = p
m
1 + sc.
Substituting pm1 and p
m
2 = p
m
1 + sc into themaximand of (A3) yields Π
cs (pm1 ) = Π
m (pm1 ), where
the equality follows because Ds (pm1 ) = 0. Then, the profit outcome in (I) can be replicated by
(IIa). As Πcs (·) is maximized at pcs1 , which differs from p
m
1 , we find that Π
cs
> Πm at the
lower bound sc = ∆c + ∆µm. Now, consider the upper bound sc = ∆c. Note that Ds (·)
disappears in the maximand of (A3). Then, it holds Πm > Πcs, because Πm is the solution
to an unconstrained maximization problem. Taking the derivative of Πcs with respect to sc
and using (A5) yields ∂Π
cs
∂sc
= (pcs1 − c1)D
′ (pcs1 + sc) < 0. As Π
m is independent of sc, there
exists a unique threshold scc ∈ (∆c+ ∆µ
m,∆c) such that for sc < s
c
c it holds Π
cs
> Πm and
the equilibrium prices are described by (A6), while for sc ≥ s
c
c it holds Π
m ≥ Πcs and the
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equilibrium prices are described by (A2), where Πcs = Πm if and only if sc = s
c
c.
(iib) Suppose, alternatively, ∆c ≤ sc < ∆c+ ∆µm. This interval is non-empty if and only if
∆µm > 0. The only relevant option is (IIb), and the equilibrium prices are described by (A8).28
(iii) Suppose sc ≥ max {∆c+ ∆µm,∆c}. The relevant options are (I) and (IIb), whose as-
sociated profits are Πm and Πcn. Given that consumer storage is absent under both options
and Πm is the solution to an unconstrained maximization problem, it holds Πm > Πcn and the
equilibrium prices are described by (A2).
Proof of Corollary 1. As ∆µm ≤ 0, the equilibrium consumer storage and prices in points
(i) and (ii) of the corollary are a direct consequence of the outcomes in points (i), (iia) and
(iii) of Proposition 1. Taking the derivative of the left-hand side of the first-order condition
for pcs1 in (A5) with respect to sc yields D
′ (pcs1 + sc) + (p
cs
1 − c1)D
′′ (pcs1 + sc) < 0, where the
inequality holds if and only if D′′ (pcs1 + sc) < D̂
′′ ≡ −
D′(pcs1 +sc)
pcs1 −c1
, with D̂′′ > 0. It follows
from the implicit function theorem that
∂pcs1
∂sc
< 0 for D′′ (·) < D̂′′. Moreover, the derivative of
the left-hand side of the first-order condition for pcs2 — obtained by replacing p1 with p2 − sc
in (A5) — with respect to sc is −2D′ (pcs2 − sc) − (p
cs
2 − sc − c1)D
′′ (pcs2 − sc) − D
′ (pcs2 ) > 0,
where the inequality follows from Assumption 1 and D′ (·) < 0. By the implicit function
theorem, we obtain
∂pcs2
∂sc
> 0. Now, we turn to the price comparisons. Substituting the first-
order condition for pm1 in (A1) into the left-hand side of the first-order condition for p
cs
1 in (A5)
yields D (pm1 + sc) + (p
m
1 − c1)D
′ (pm1 + sc). This expression vanishes if and only if sc = 0,
which implies pm1 = p
cs
1 . As
∂pcs1
∂sc
< 0 for D′′ (·) < D̂′′ but pm1 is independent of sc, for sc > 0 we
obtain pm1 > p
cs
1 when D
′′ (·) < D̂′′.
Proof of Corollary 2. As ∆µm > 0, the equilibrium consumer storage and prices in points (i),
(ii) and (iii) of the corollary are a direct consequence of the outcomes in points (i), (iib) and
(iii) of Proposition 1. It follows from the proof of Corollary 1 that
∂pcs1
∂sc
> 0 for D′′ (·) > D̂′′
and that
∂pcs2
∂sc
> 0. Taking the derivative of the left-hand side of the first-order condition for
pcn1 in (A7) with respect to sc yields 2D
′ (pcn1 + sc) + (p
cn
1 + sc − c2)D
′′ (pcn2 + sc) < 0, where
the inequality follows from Assumption 1. Using the implicit function theorem, we obtain
∂pcn1
∂sc
< 0. Moreover, the derivative of the left-hand side of the first-order condition for pcn2
— obtained by replacing p1 with p2 − sc in (A7) — with respect to sc is −2D
′ (pcn2 − sc) −
(pcn2 − sc − c1)D
′′ (pcn2 − sc) > 0, where the inequality follows from Assumption 1. We find
from the implicit function theorem that
∂pcn2
∂sc
> 0. Now, we turn to the price comparisons.
Recall from the proof of Corollary 1 that pcs1 = p
m
1 if and only if sc = 0. For sc > 0, we have
pcs1 > p
m
1 when D
′′ (·) > D̂′′, because
∂pcs1
∂sc
> 0 but pm1 is independent of sc. Moreover, given
∂pcn1
∂sc
< 0 and the continuity of the price strategy, we obtain pcn1 > p
m
1 . Finally, it follows from
∂pcs2
∂sc
> 0,
∂pcn2
∂sc
> 0,
∂pm2
∂sc
= 0 and the continuity of the price strategy that pm2 > p
cn
2 > p
cs
2 .
Proof of Proposition 2. Proceeding backwards, we find from (8) that the second period price
is given by
p2 = c2 −
D (p2)− Ds (p1)
D′ (p2)
. (A9)
Moving to the first period, the firm faces the following three pricing options: (I) p1 + sc > p2;
28Clearly, for sc = ∆c cases (IIa) and (IIb) coincide.
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(II) p1 + sc = p2; (III) p1 + sc < p2.
Option (I) p1+ sc > p2. It follows from (1) that Ds (p1) = 0. As under full commitment, the
equilibrium prices are set at the static monopoly level in (A2). This solution is implementable
if and only if the feasibility constraint (6) is fulfilled.
Option (II) p1 + sc = p2. It follows from (1) that Ds (p1) ∈ [0,D (p1 + sc)]. The firm’s first
period maximization problem is given by (7), subject to (A9). We find from (A9) and p1 + sc =
p2 that Ds (p1) = max {0,D (p1 + sc) + (p1 + sc − c1 − ∆c)D
′ (p1 + sc)}. The following two
cases emerge.
(IIa) Let Ds (p1) > 0. The firm’s first period maximization problem becomes
max
p1
(p1 − c1) [D (p1) + D (p1 + sc)] + (∆c− sc) (p1 + sc − c1 − ∆c)D
′ (p1 + sc) . (A10)
The first-order condition for p1 is
D (p1) + D (p1 + sc) + (p1 − c1)
[
D′ (p1) + D
′ (p1 + sc)
]
+ (∆c− sc)
[
D′ (p1 + sc) + (p1 + sc − c1 − ∆c)D
′′ (p1 + sc)
]
= 0. (A11)
Using (5), we obtain the equilibrium limited commitment storing prices
p∗s1 = c1 −
D (p∗s1 ) + φ2 (p
∗s
1 + sc) + (∆c− sc) φ
′
2 (p
∗s
1 + sc)
D′
(
p∗s1
) and p∗s2 = p∗s1 + sc. (A12)
Consumer storage is D∗ss = D (p
∗s
1 + sc) + (p
∗s
1 + sc − c1 − ∆c)D
′ (p∗s1 + sc) = φ2 (p
∗s
1 + sc).
To derive the condition under which this solution is feasible, i.e., D∗ss > 0, we compute the
derivative of D∗ss with respect to sc. This yields
∂D∗ss
∂sc
=
∂p∗s2
∂sc
[
2D′ (p∗s2 ) + (p
∗s
2 − c1 − ∆c)D
′′ (p∗s2 )
]
< 0,
where the inequality follows from
∂p∗s2
∂sc
> 0 (see Corollaries 3 and 4) and the negative sign of
the expression in square brackets (by Assumption 1). Now, we prove that D∗ss > 0 at sc = 0.
Note that this is the case if and only if D (p∗s1 ) + (p
∗s
1 − c1 − ∆c)D
′ (p∗s1 ) > 0. This means from
the first-order condition for pm2 in (A1) that p
∗s
1 = p
∗s
2 < p
m
2 . Substituting (A1) into the left-
hand side of the first-order condition for p∗s1 in (A11) evaluated at sc = 0 yields after some
manipulation ∆c [2D′ (pm2 ) + (p
m
2 − c2)D
′′ (pm2 )] + ∆cD
′ (pm2 ) < 0, where the inequality holds
because the expression in square brackets is negative (by Assumption 1) and D′ (·) < 0. This
implies that p∗s1 = p
∗s
2 < p
m
2 and therefore D
∗s
s > 0 at sc = 0. By continuity, we have D
∗s
s > 0
for sc small enough. As D
∗s
s < 0 for sc arbitrarily large, we can conclude that there exists a
unique threshold s˜∗c > 0 such that D
∗s
s > 0 if and only if sc < s˜
∗
c .
(IIb) For sc ≥ s˜∗c , consumers do not store, i.e., D
∗n
s = 0. We find from (A9) that the equilibrium
limited commitment no-storing prices are
p∗n1 = p
∗n
2 − sc and p
∗n
2 = p
m
2 = c2 + µ
m
2 . (A13)
As the firm’s maximization problem in (A10) allows for any Ds (·), option (IIa) dominates
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option (IIb) as long as it is feasible, i.e., D∗ss > 0.
Option (III) p1 + sc < p2. It follows from (1) that Ds (p1) = D (p1 + sc). As discussed
in Section 5, this option is not implementable, because the firm has an incentive to reduce p2
below p1 + sc and serve the market in the second period.
We obtain the following results.
(i) Suppose sc < min {∆c+ ∆µm, s˜∗c}. The only relevant option is (IIa), and the equilibrium
prices are described by (A12).
(iia) Suppose ∆c+ ∆µm ≤ sc ≤ s˜∗c . The relevant options are (I) and (IIa).
29 We know from
the feasibility constraint (6) that at the lower bound sc = ∆c + ∆µm it holds pm2 = p
m
1 + sc.
Substituting pm1 and p
m
2 = p
m
1 + sc into the maximand of (7) yields Π
∗s (pm1 ) = Π
m (pm1 ), where
the equality follows because Ds (pm1 ) = 0. Hence, the profit outcome in (I) can be replicated
by (IIa). As Π∗s (·) is maximized at p∗s1 , which differs from p
m
1 , we find that Π
∗s
> Πm at
the lower bound sc = ∆c+ ∆µm. At the upper bound sc = s˜∗c , there is no storing in (IIa). This
implies that Πm > Π∗s, because Πm is the solution to an unconstrainedmaximization problem.
Taking the derivative of Π∗s with respect to sc and using (A11) yields after some manipulation
∂Π∗s
∂sc
= (∆c− sc) [2D′ (p∗s1 + sc) + (p
∗s
1 + sc − c2)D
′′ (p∗s1 + sc)], where the expression in square
brackets is negative (by Assumption 1). In principle, the following three cases emerge: (1) if
s˜∗c < ∆c, then
∂Π∗s
∂sc
< 0; (2) if ∆c+ ∆µm ≤ ∆c ≤ s˜∗c , then
∂Π∗s
∂sc
< 0 for sc < ∆c and
∂Π∗s
∂sc
> 0
for sc > ∆c (with a minimum at sc = ∆c); (3) if ∆c < ∆c+ ∆µm, i.e., ∆µm > 0, then
∂Π∗s
∂sc
> 0.
Note that case (3) is impossible, because it contradicts the previous result that Π∗s > Πm
at the lower bound sc = ∆c + ∆µm and Πm > Π∗s at the upper bound sc = s˜∗c , where Π
m
is independent of sc. First, consider case (1). As
∂Π∗s
∂sc
< 0, there exists a unique point of
equalization between Π∗s and Πm. Now, consider case (2). Given that the impossibility of
case (3) implies ∆µm ≤ 0, we know from point (ii) of Corollary 1 that for sc ≥ s
c
c the static
monopoly solution is implemented under full commitment. Being sequentially optimal, the
static monopoly solution must be implemented under limited commitment as well. As Π∗s >
Πm at the lower bound sc = ∆c+ ∆µm and Πm > Π∗s for sc ≥ s
c
c, where s
c
c < ∆c, the point
of equalization between Π∗s and Πm must lie in the region where sc < ∆c, namely, in the
declining part of Π∗s. This implies that the point of equalization is again unique. Summarizing,
either in case (1) or case (2), we find that ∂Π
∗s
∂sc
< 0 in the relevant range for sc. Hence, there
exists a unique threshold s∗c ∈ (∆c+ ∆µ
m, s˜∗c ) such that for sc < s
∗
c it holds Π
∗s
> Πm and
the equilibrium prices are described by (A12), while for sc ≥ s
∗
c it holds Π
m ≥ Π∗s and the
equilibrium prices are described by (A2), where Πm = Π∗s if and only if sc = s
∗
c .
(iib) Suppose, alternatively, s˜∗c ≤ sc < ∆c+ ∆µ
m. The only relevant option is (IIb), and the
equilibrium prices are described by (A13).
(iii) Suppose sc ≥ max {∆c+ ∆µm, s˜∗c}. The relevant options are (I) and (IIb). As consumer
storage is absent under both options and Πm is the solution to an unconstrained maximization
problem, it holds Πm > Π∗n and the equilibrium prices are described by (A2).
Proof of Corollary 3. As ∆c + ∆µm ≤ s˜∗c , the equilibrium consumer storage and prices in
points (i) and (ii) of the corollary are a direct consequence of the outcomes in points (i), (iia)
and (iii) of Proposition 2. The derivative of the left-hand side of the first-order condition for
29Clearly, for sc = s˜∗c cases (IIa) and (IIb) coincide.
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p∗s1 in (A11) with respect to sc vanishes for D
′′ (·) = 0. Using the implicit function theo-
rem, this implies that
∂p∗s1
∂sc
= 0. Furthermore, taking the derivative of the left-hand side of
the first-order condition for p∗s2 — obtained by replacing p1 with p2 − sc in (A11) — with re-
spect to sc yields after some manipulation − [2D′ (p∗s2 − sc) + (p
∗s
2 − sc − c1)D
′′ (p∗s2 − sc)] −
[2D′ (p∗s2 ) + (p
∗s
2 − c2)D
′′ (p∗s2 )] > 0, where the inequality holds because each expression in
square brackets is negative (by Assumption 1). We find from the implicit function theorem
that
∂p∗s2
∂sc
> 0. Now, we now turn to the price comparisons. Substituting the first-order con-
dition for pm1 in (A1) into the left-hand side of the first-order condition for p
∗s
1 in (A11) with
D′′ = 0 yields D (pm1 + sc) + (p
m
1 − c1)D
′ + (∆c− sc)D′. As for sc = 0 this expression reduces
to ∆cD′ < 0 and both p∗s1 (with D
′′ = 0) and pm1 do not depend on sc, we obtain from Assump-
tion 1 that pm1 > p
∗s
1 for D
′′ = 0. It follows from D∗ss = D (p
∗s
2 ) + (p
∗s
2 − c2)D
′ (p∗s2 ) > 0 that
pm2 > p
∗s
2 .
Proof of Corollary 4. As ∆c+∆µm > s˜∗c , the equilibrium consumer storage and prices in points
(i), (ii) and (iii) of the corollary are a direct consequence of the outcomes in points (i), (iib) and
(iii) of Proposition 2. It is straightforward to see that
∂p∗n1
∂sc
< 0. Moreover, we know from the
proof of Corollary 3 that
∂p∗s2
∂sc
> 0. Now, we turn to the price comparisons. Given
∂p∗n1
∂sc
< 0 and
the continuity of the price strategy, we obtain p∗n1 > p
m
1 . It follows from
∂p∗s2
∂sc
> 0,
∂pm2
∂sc
= 0 and
the continuity of the price strategy that pm2 > p
∗s
2 .
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof proceeds through the following four cases: (I) ∆µm ≤ 0
and ∆c + ∆µm ≤ s˜∗c ; (II) ∆µ
m ≤ 0 and ∆c + ∆µm > s˜∗c ; (III) ∆µ
m
> 0 and ∆c + ∆µm > s˜∗c ;
(IV) ∆µm > 0 and ∆c + ∆µm ≤ s˜∗c . Note that the thresholds s
c
c ∈ (∆c+ ∆µ
m,∆c) and s∗c ∈
(∆c+ ∆µm, s˜∗c ) defined in Propositions 1 and 2 are such that s
∗
c < s
c
c. The rationale is the
following. The limited commitment profits are strictly lower than the full commitment profits
(as long as they differ), and the profits under the two commitment regimes decrease with sc
in the presence of consumer storage (see the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2). Therefore, the
point of equalization between the static monopoly profits and the limited commitment storing
profits, which identifies s∗c , must be strictly lower than the corresponding point under full
commitment, which identifies scc.
Case (I) ∆µm ≤ 0 and ∆c+ ∆µm ≤ s˜∗c . It follows from Corollaries 1 and 3 that the following
three subcases emerge.
(Ia) If sc < s
∗
c , the full commitment prices are p
cs
1 and p
cs
2 and the limited commitment prices
are p∗s1 and p
∗s
2 . After substituting the first-order condition for p
∗s
1 in (A11) into the left-hand
side of the first-order condition for pcs1 in (A5) and using D
N
2 (p1) ≡ D (p1 + sc)− Ds (p1), we
find that
− (∆c− sc)
[
D′ (p∗s1 + sc) + (p
∗s
1 + sc − c2)D
′′ (p∗s1 + sc)
]
= (∆c− sc)
∂DN2 (p
∗s
1 )
∂p1
> 0,
where the inequality holds if and only ifD′′ (p∗s1 + sc) < −
D′(p∗s1 +sc)
p∗s1 +sc−c2
or, equivalently,
∂DN2 (p∗s1 )
∂p1
>
0 (recall sc < s
∗
c < s
c
c < ∆c). As p
cs
2 = p
cs
1 + sc and p
∗s
2 = p
∗s
1 + sc, it follows from Assumption 1
that p∗sτ < p
cs
τ , τ ∈ {1, 2}, if and only if
∂DN2 (p∗s1 )
∂p1
> 0.
(Ib) If s∗c ≤ sc < s
c
c, the full commitment prices are p
cs
1 and p
cs
2 and the limited commitment
prices are pm1 and p
m
2 . Substituting the first-order condition for p
m
1 in (A1) into the left-hand
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side of the first-order condition for pcs1 in (A5) yields
D (pm1 + sc) + (p
m
1 − c1)D
′ (pm1 + sc) < 0,
where the inequality holds because pm1 + sc > p
m
2 (which follows from sc ≥ s
∗
c > ∆c + ∆µ
m
and (6)) implies D (pm1 + sc) + (p
m
1 − c1)D
′ (pm1 + sc) < (∆c− sc)D
′ (pm1 + sc) < 0 (recall sc <
scc < ∆c). By Assumption 1, we obtain p
m
1 > p
cs
1 . Substituting the first-order condition for p
m
2
in (A1) into the left-hand side of the first-order condition for pcs2 — obtained by replacing p1
with p2 − sc in (A5) — yields
D (pm2 − sc) + (p
m
2 − sc − c1)D
′ (pm2 − sc) + (∆c− sc)D
′ (pm2 ) ,
whose sign is ambiguous. Computing this expression at sc = ∆c+ ∆µm < s
∗
c and at sc = ∆c >
scc we find that −∆µ
mD′ (pm2 ) ≤ 0 (where the inequality holds for ∆µ
m
< 0) and D (pm2 − ∆c) +
(pm2 − ∆c− c1)D
′ (pm2 − ∆c) > 0 (as p
m
1 + ∆c > p
m
2 ), respectively. As
∂pcs2
∂sc
> 0 (see Corollaries
1 and 2) but
∂pm2
∂sc
= 0, there exists a unique threshold for sc that lies between ∆c + ∆µm and
∆c such that it holds pm2 > p
cs
2 if and only if sc is below this threshold. However, it cannot be
generally established whether the threshold lies within the relevant interval for sc.
(Ic) If sc ≥ s
c
c, the full commitment prices coincide with the limited commitment prices and
correspond to the static monopoly prices pm1 and p
m
2 .
Case (II) ∆µm ≤ 0 and ∆c+∆µm > s˜∗c . It follows fromCorollaries 1 and 4 that the following
four subcases emerge.
(IIa) If sc < s˜
∗
c , case (Ia) applies.
(IIb) If s˜∗c ≤ sc < ∆c+ ∆µ
m, the full commitment prices are pcs1 and p
cs
2 and the limited com-
mitment prices are p∗n1 and p
∗n
2 . Substituting the first-order condition for p
∗n
2 in (A1) into the
left-hand side of the first-order condition for pcs2 — obtained by replacing p1 with p2 − sc in
(A5) — yields
D (pm2 − sc) + (p
m
2 − sc − c1)D
′ (pm2 − sc) + (∆c− sc)D
′ (pm2 ) < 0,
where the inequality follows from pm1 + sc < p
m
2 (recall sc < ∆c + ∆µ
m and (6)) and from
D′ (·) < 0 (recall sc < ∆c). As pcs1 = p
cs
2 − sc and p
∗n
1 = p
∗n
2 − sc, we find from Assumption 1
that p∗nτ > p
cs
τ , τ ∈ {1, 2}.
(IIc) If ∆c+ ∆µm ≤ sc < s
c
c, case (Ib) applies.
(IId) If sc ≥ s
c
c, case (Ic) applies.
Case (III) ∆µm > 0 and ∆c + ∆µm > s˜∗c . It follows from Corollaries 2 and 4 that the
following five subcases emerge.
(IIIa) If sc < min {∆c, s˜∗c}, case (Ia) applies.
(IIIb) If ∆c ≤ sc < s˜∗c , the full commitment prices are p
cn
1 and p
cn
2 and the limited commitment
prices are p∗s1 and p
∗s
2 . Substituting the first-order condition for p
∗s
1 in (A11) into the left-hand
side of the first-order condition for pcn1 in (A7) yields
− (∆c− sc)
[
2D′ (p∗s1 + sc) + (p
∗s
1 + sc − c2)D
′′ (p∗s1 + sc)
]
≤ 0,
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where the expression in square brackets is negative by Assumption 1 and the equality holds if
and only if sc = ∆c. As pcn2 = p
cn
1 + sc and p
∗s
2 = p
∗s
1 + sc, it follows from Assumption 1 that
p∗sτ ≥ p
cn
τ , τ ∈ {1, 2}, where the equality holds if and only if sc = ∆c.
(IIIc) If, alternatively, s˜∗c ≤ sc < ∆c, case (IIb) applies.
(IIId) If max {∆c, s˜∗c} ≤ sc < ∆c + ∆µ
m, the full commitment prices are pcn1 and p
cn
2 and the
limited commitment prices are p∗n1 and p
∗n
2 . Substituting the first-order condition for p
∗n
2 in
(A1) into the left-hand side of the first-order condition for pcn2 —obtained by replacing p1 with
p2 − sc in (A7) — yields
D (pm2 − sc) + (p
m
2 − sc − c1)D
′ (pm2 − sc) < 0,
where the inequality follows from pm1 + sc < p
m
2 (recall sc < ∆c + ∆µ
m and (6)). As pcn1 =
pcn2 − sc and p
∗n
1 = p
∗n
2 − sc, it follows from Assumption 1 that p
∗n
τ > p
cn
τ , τ ∈ {1, 2}.
(IIIe) If sc ≥ ∆c+ ∆µm, case (Ic) applies.
Case (IV) ∆µm > 0 and ∆c+ ∆µm ≤ s˜∗c . We show by contradiction that this case is impossi-
ble. It follows from Corollaries 2 and 3 that for sc ∈ (∆c+ ∆µm, s
∗
c ) the full commitment prices
are pm1 and p
m
2 and the limited commitment prices are p
∗s
1 and p
∗s
2 . As the static monopoly
solution is sequentially optimal, this solution should also be implemented under limited com-
mitment. Hence, case (IV) is impossible.30
After defining
slc ≡

s∗c if case (I) applies
s˜∗c if case (II) applies
min {∆c, s˜∗c} if case (III) applies
, (A14)
we find from cases (Ia), (IIa) and (IIIa) that for sc < s
l
c in each period the price under limited
commitment is lower than the price under full commitment, i.e., p∗sτ < p
cs
τ , τ ∈ {1, 2}, if and
only if
∂DN2 (p∗s1 )
∂p1
> 0.
Proof of Proposition 4. Using the results in the proof of Proposition 3, we define shc as
shc ≡
{
scc if case (I) or (II) applies
∆c+ ∆µm if case (III) applies
. (A15)
A. Suppose slc ≤ sc < s
h
c . It follows from cases (Ib), (IIb), (IIc), (IIIb), (IIIc) and (IIId) in the
proof of Proposition 3 that in the first period the price under limited commitment is higher
than the price under full commitment. If ∆µm > 0, it follows from cases (IIIb), (IIIc) and (IIId)
in the proof of Proposition 3 that the price under limited commitment is also higher in the
second period.
B. Suppose sc ≥ shc . It follows from cases (Ic), (IId) and (IIIe) in the proof of Proposition 3
that the prices under full and limited commitment coincide with the static monopoly prices in
each period.
Proof of Remark 1. To see the result in point (i) of the corollary, note from (A5) that pcs1 does
30Alternatively, it follows from point (iia) of the proof of Proposition 2 that ∆µm > 0 is impossible when ∆c+
∆µm ≤ s˜∗c .
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not depend on ∆c (for a given c1). As p
cs
2 = p
cs
1 + sc, it holds
∂pcsτ
∂∆c = 0, τ ∈ {1, 2}. To see
the result in point (ii), note from the implicit function theorem that the sign of
∂p∗s1
∂∆c is equal to
the sign of the derivative of the left-hand side of the first-order condition for p∗s1 in (A11) with
respect to ∆c, which is given by
D′ (p∗s1 + sc) + (p
∗s
1 + 2sc − c1 − 2∆c)D
′′ (p∗s1 + sc) .
To establish the sign of this expression, consider the second period net demand DN2 (p1) ≡
D (p1 + sc)− Ds (p1) = − (p1 + sc − c1 − ∆c)D
′ (p1 + sc). Then,
∂
∂∆c
[
(∆c− sc)
∂DN2 (p
∗s
1 )
∂p1
]
= −D′ (p∗s1 + sc)− (p
∗s
1 + 2sc − c1 − 2∆c)D
′′ (p∗s1 + sc) .
As p∗s2 = p
∗s
1 + sc, we find
∂p∗sτ
∂∆c < 0, τ ∈ {1, 2}, if and only if
∂
∂∆c
[
(∆c− sc)
∂DN2 (p∗s1 )
∂p1
]
> 0.
Proof of Proposition 5. Consumer surplus under full and limited commitment is respectively
Ψcs =
∫
pcs1
D (p) dp+
∫
pcs1 +sc
D (p) dp and Ψ∗s =
∫
p∗s1
D (p) dp+
∫
p∗s1 +sc
D (p) dp.
Taking the difference between Ψ∗s and Ψcs yields
∆Ψ ≡ Ψ∗s − Ψcs =
∫ pcs1
p∗s1
D (p) dp+
∫ pcs1 +sc
p∗s1 +sc
D (p) dp. (A16)
We know from Proposition 3 that p∗sτ < p
cs
τ , τ ∈ {1, 2}, if and only if
∂DN2 (p∗s1 )
∂p1
> 0. This implies
∆Ψ > 0 if and only if
∂DN2 (p∗s1 )
∂p1
> 0.
We now turn to total welfare W ≡ Ψ + Π. The firm’s full commitment profits Πcs are
given by the maximand of (A4). The firm’s limited commitment profits Π∗s are given by the
maximand of (A10) and can be rewritten as
Π∗s = (p∗s1 − c1) [D (p
cs
1 ) + D (p
cs
1 + sc)] + (p
∗s
1 − c1) [D (p
∗s
1 )− D (p
cs
1 )
+D (p∗s1 + sc)− D (p
cs
1 + sc)] + (∆c− sc) (p
∗s
1 + sc − c1 − ∆c)D
′ (p∗s1 + sc) .
Taking the difference between Π∗s and Πcs, we obtain
∆Π ≡ Π∗s − Πcs = − (pcs1 − p
∗s
1 ) [D (p
cs
1 ) + D (p
cs
1 + sc)] + (p
∗s
1 − c1) [D (p
∗s
1 )− D (p
cs
1 )
+D (p∗s1 + sc)− D (p
cs
1 + sc)] + (∆c− sc) (p
∗s
1 + sc − c1 − ∆c)D
′ (p∗s1 + sc) . (A17)
Summing (A16) and (A17) yields
∆W ≡ ∆Ψ + ∆Π =
∫ pcs1
p∗s1
D (p) dp+
∫ pcs1 +sc
p∗s1 +sc
D (p) dp− (pcs1 − p
∗s
1 ) [D (p
cs
1 ) + D (p
cs
1 + sc)]
+ (p∗s1 − c1) [D (p
∗s
1 )− D (p
cs
1 ) + D (p
∗s
1 + sc)− D (p
cs
1 + sc)]
+ (∆c− sc) (p
∗s
1 + sc − c1 − ∆c)D
′ (p∗s1 + sc) . (A18)
39
Suppose
∂DN2 (p∗s1 )
∂p1
> 0, which implies from Proposition 3 that p∗sτ < p
cs
τ , τ ∈ {1, 2}. The
aggregate expression in the first line of (A18) is positive. To see this, note that this expression
can be rewritten as∫ pcs1
p∗s1
D (p) dp−
∫ pcs1
p∗s1
D (pcs1 ) dp+
∫ pcs1 +sc
p∗s1 +sc
D (p) dp−
∫ pcs1 +sc
p∗s1 +sc
D (pcs1 + sc) dp > 0,
where the inequality follows from D′ (·) < 0. The expression in the second line of (A18) is
positive as well. The expression in the third line of (A18) corresponds to − (∆c− sc)DN2 (p
∗s
1 ),
where DN2 (p1) ≡ D (p1 + sc)−Ds (p1). As sc < s
l
c (by supposition in the proposition) and s
l
c ≤
∆c (see the proof of Proposition 3), we find ∆W > 0 if DN2 (·) is small enough. Now, suppose
∂DN2 (p∗s1 )
∂p1
≤ 0. This implies ∆Ψ ≤ 0, where the equality holds if and only if
∂DN2 (p∗s1 )
∂p1
= 0. Given
that ∆Π < 0 (the limited commitment profits are lower than the full commitment profits), we
obtain ∆W ≡ ∆Ψ + ∆Π < 0.
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Storable good market with intertemporal cost variations
Supplementary Appendix
Fabio Antoniou∗ Raffaele Fiocco†
1 Introduction
This Supplementary Appendix complements the paper and proceeds as follows. Section 2
extends our analysis to the firm’s inventories and convex storage costs. Section 3 investigates
uncertainty about production costs. Section 4 considers convex production costs. Section 5
explores the case of durable goods. Section 6 incorporates a more general discount factor into
our model. Section 7 provides a full characterization of the results in a framework with linear
demand.
2 Firm’s inventories and convex storage costs
We denote by sc (Ds) the storage costs associated with consumer storage Ds, where s′c (·) ≥
0 (with s′c (·) > 0 for Ds > 0) and s′′c (·) > 0. The firm can also store a quantity I in the
form of inventories intended for future sales at a cost s f (I), where s
′
f (·) ≥ 0 (with s′f (·) > 0
for I > 0) and s′′f (·) > 0. Consistently with the baseline model, we consider a framework
where, under full commitment, the firm does not produce in the second period. Therefore,
the aggregate quantity that the firm and consumers store in the first period suffices to cover
the entire demand in the second period. Under limited commitment, the firm’s inventories
and consumer storage may still be sufficiently large so that no production takes place in the
second period. Alternatively, the firm prefers to produce in the second period as well. In
the following remark, we focus on the case where production only occurs in the first period.
Moreover, we consider the plausible situation where consumers store to a lower extent under
limited commitment for given prices. This captures the idea that consumers are more reluctant
to store in anticipation of the firm’s opportunistic behavior. Evaluating consumer storage at
the equilibrium full commitment prices, we have D∗cis < Dcis . As shown in the linear-quadratic
example presented in the sequel, this outcome emerges endogenously irrespective of whether
the firm produces in the second period as well.
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Greece; Humboldt University of Berlin, Institute for Economic Theory I, Spandauer Straße 1, 10178 Berlin, Ger-
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Remark 3 Suppose 0 < D∗cis < Dcis . Then, in each period the price under limited commitment is lower
than the price under full commitment, i.e., p∗iτ < pciτ , τ ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof of Remark 3. Following the same rationale as in the baseline model, the storability
constraint is binding in equilibrium, i.e., p2 = p1 + s
′
c (Ds (·)). The firm’s aggregate profits are
Π
i = (p1 − c1) [D (p1) + Ds (·)] +
[
p1 + s
′
c (Ds (·))− c1
] [
D
(
p1 + s
′
c (Ds (·))
)− Ds (·)]
− s f
(
D
(
p1 + s
′
c (Ds (·))
)− Ds (·)) . (S1)
Under full commitment, differentiating (S1) with respect to p1 and Ds yields the following
first-order conditions
dΠci
dp1
=
∂Πi (p1)
∂p1
= 0 (S2)
dΠci
dDs
=
∂Πi (Ds)
∂Ds
= 0.
This gives the equilibrium first period price pci1 and consumer storage D
ci
s under full commit-
ment. The corresponding equilibrium second period price follows from the binding storability
constraint, i.e., pci2 = p
ci
1 + s
′
c
(
Dcis
)
.
Under limited commitment, proceeding backwards, we first consider the firm’s problem of
maximizing Πi2 = ( p2 − c2) [D ( p2)− Ds (p1)] with respect to p2.1 Using the binding storabil-
ity constraint p2 = p1 + s
′
c (Ds (p1)) yields the following first-order condition
D
(
p1 + s
′
c (Ds (p1))
)− Ds (p1) + [p1 + s′c (Ds (p1))− c2]D′ ( p1 + s′c (Ds (p1))) = 0. (S3)
Applying the implicit function theorem, we find that
∂Ds
∂p1
= − ∂
2
Π
i
2/∂p
2
1
∂2Πi2/∂p1∂Ds
=
∂2Πi2/∂p
2
1
1− (∂2Πi2/∂p21) s′′c (Ds) < 0, (S4)
where the inequality follows from
∂2Πi2
∂p21
< 0 (by Assumption 1) and s′′c (·) > 0. In the first
period, differentiating (S1) with respect to p1 yields
dΠ∗i
dp1
=
∂Πi (p1)
∂p1
+
∂Πi (Ds)
∂Ds
∂Ds
∂p1
= 0. (S5)
This gives the equilibrium first period price p∗i1 under limited commitment. Equilibrium con-
sumer storage D∗is satisfies (S3). The corresponding equilibrium second period price follows
from the binding storability constraint, i.e., p∗i2 = p
∗i
1 + s
′
c
(
D∗is
)
.
Comparing (S2) and (S5) evaluated at pci1 , we obtain that
dΠ∗i
(
pci1
)
dp1
− dΠ
ci
dp1
=
∂Πi
(
D∗cis
)
∂Ds
∂Ds
∂p1
< 0,
1Although the firm does not produce in the second period, the incorporation of the second period cost into the
firm’s maximization problem ensures sequential optimality in the light of the firm’s temptation to reduce the price
and produce in the second period. This solution generates the highest consumer storage.
2
where the inequality follows from
∂Πi(D∗cis )
∂Ds
> 0 (as D∗cis < Dcis ) and
∂Ds
∂p1
< 0 (see (S4)). Hence,
it holds p∗i1 < p
ci
1 . Using the storability constraint and equation (S4), we find that
dp∗i2
dp1
=
1+ s′′c (Ds)
∂Ds
∂p1
> 0. Then, we have p∗i2 = p
∗i
1 + s
′
c
(
D∗is
)
< pci1 + s
′
c
(
D∗cis
)
< pci1 + s
′
c
(
Dcis
)
= pci2
(recall s′′c (·) > 0 and D∗cis < Dcis ). This implies p∗i2 < pci2 .
Linear-quadratic framework We now derive explicit results in a framework characterized by
a linear demand function of the form D (pτ) = α− βpτ, τ ∈ {1, 2}, with α > 0 and β > 0. The
unit production cost is c1 in the first period and c2 in the second period, where ∆c ≡ c2− c1 > 0
and c2 <
α
β . Consumer storage costs are sc (Ds) =
1
2kcD
2
s , with kc > 0, and the firm’s storage
costs are s f (I) =
1
2k f I
2, with k f > 0. Given the binding storability constraint, i.e., p2 = p1 +
s′c (Ds (·)) , the firm’s inventories are defined as I ≡ D (p1 + s′c (Ds (·)) ) − Ds (·) − 1Q2 · Q2,
where the indicator function 1Q2 ∈ {0, 1} assumes a value of zero if no production takes place
in the second period and a value of one otherwise. As previously discussed, we focus on the
case where there is no production in the second period under full commitment.2 The analysis
is split into two separate cases according to whether or not production occurs in the second
period under limited commitment. In Case A there is no production in the second period and
the indicator function takes a value of zero, whereas in Case B production occurs in the second
period and the indicator function takes a value of one.
Case A Given that no production takes place in the second period, it follows from the
binding storability constraint p2 = p1 + kcDs (·) that the firm’s aggregate profits are
Π
i = (p1 − c1) [α− βp1 + Ds (·)] + [p1 + kcDs (·)− c1] [α− β (p1 + kcDs (·))− Ds (·)]
−1
2
k f [α− β (p1 + kcDs (·))− Ds (·)]2 . (S6)
Under full commitment, differentiating (S6) with respect to p1 and Ds yields p
ci
1 = p
m
1 =
α+βc1
2β and D
ci
s =
k f (α−βc1)
2[k f +kc(2+βk f )]
. It follows from the binding storability constraint that pci2 =
pci1 + kcD
ci
s .
Under limited commitment, the firm’s second period maximization problem gives p2 =
α+βc2−Ds
2β . It follows from the binding storability constraint that Ds (p1) =
α+βc2−2βp1
1+2βkc
. Sub-
stituting this expression into (S6) and differentiating with respect to p1, we find after some
manipulation p∗i1 =
2α+β[2c1(1+βkc)(1+2βkc)+βc2(k f +kc(2+βk f ))+kc(8+4βkc−βk f )α]
β[4+β(8kc(2+βkc)+k f )]
and p∗i2 = p
∗i
1 +
βkc[k f (α−βc2)+4∆c(1+βkc)]
4+β[8kc(2+βkc)+k f ]
. To preserve the essence of the firm’s commitment problem, consumer
storage under limited commitment must be lower than under full commitment at given prices.
Evaluating consumer storage at the equilibrium full commitment prices, we have D∗cis < Dcis ,
as in Remark 3. There exists a threshold for c2, given by c
max
2 ≡
α(1+2βkc)k f +βc1(4kc+k f )
2β[k f +kc(2+βk f )]
, such that
D∗cis < Dcis if and only if c2 < cmax2 . For c2 = c
max
2 − ε, where ε > 0, we find that
p∗i1 − pci1 = −ε
β
[
k f + kc
(
2+ βk f
)]
4+ β
[
8kc (2+ βkc) + k f
] < 0
2Our results do not qualitatively change if production takes place in the second period as well.
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and
p∗i2 − pci2 = −ε
β
(
6kc + 4βk2c + k f
)
4+ β
[
8kc (2+ βkc) + k f
] < 0.
Finally, we derive the range of values for ε under which the firm prefers to accumulate
inventories in order to cover the entire demand in the second period. This is the case if and
only if the first period unit cost of production inflated by the marginal storage cost is (weakly)
lower than the second period unit cost of production, i.e.,
c1+ k f
[
α− β
(
p∗i1 + kcDs
(
p∗i1 , c
max
2 − ε
))
− Ds
(
p∗i1 , c
max
2 − ε
)]
− c2 ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ ε ≤ (α− βc1)ω,
where ω ≡ k f [4+β(8kc(2+βkc)+k f )]
2β[4+8βkc(2+βkc)+β(5+2βkc(5+2βkc))k f ][k f +kc(2+βk f )]
> 0. For ε > (α− βc1)ω, Case B
applies.
Case B Under full commitment, the solution is the same as in Case A. Under limited
commitment, the firm now produces in the second period as well. Given the second pe-
riod maximization problem and the binding storability constraint p2 = p1 + kcDs (p1), we
find that Ds (p1) =
α+βc2−2βp1
1+2βkc
. This implies that the firm’s inventories are given by I =
α− β (p1 + kcDs (p1))−Ds (p1)−Q2 = β p1−c2(1+βkc)+kcα1+2βkc −Q2. The firm produces the quantity
Qτ in period τ ∈ {1, 2} in order to solve the following cost minimization problem
min
Q1,Q2
1
2
k f I
2 + ∆cQ2 s.t. I + Q2 = β
p1 − c2 (1+ βkc) + kcα
1+ 2βkc
,
which reduces to
min
Q2
1
2
k f
[
β
p1 − c2 (1+ βkc) + kcα
1+ 2βkc
−Q2
]2
+ ∆cQ2.
The first-order condition for Q2 is given by
k f
[
β
p1 − c2 (1+ βkc) + kcα
1+ 2βkc
−Q2
]
− ∆c = 0.
This yields Q2 = β
p1−c2(1+βkc)+kcα
(1+2βkc)
− ∆ck f and I = ∆ck f . The firm’s first period maximization
problem is
max
p1
(p1 − c1) [α− βp1 + Ds (p1)] + [p1 + kcDs (p1)− c1]
× [α− β (p1 + kcDs (p1))− Ds (p1)]− 1
2
k f I
2 − ∆cQ2,
where Ds (p1) =
α+βc2−2βp1
1+2βkc
, I = ∆ck f and Q2 = β
p1−c2(1+βkc)+kcα
(1+2βkc)
− ∆ck f . We find that p∗i1 =
pci1 − 14 ∆c1+2βkc(2+βkc) and p∗i2 =
p∗i1 +(α+βc2)kc
1+2βkc
. To compare prices under the two commitment
regimes, we consider the minimum value for c2 under full commitment (where no production
4
takes place in the second period), i.e., c2 = cmin2 ≡
(αkc+c1)k f +2kcc1
(1+βkc)k f +2kc
. This yields
p∗i1 − pci1 = −
α− βc1
4 [1+ 2βkc (2+ βkc)]
[
k f + kc
(
2+ βk f
)] < 0
and
p∗i2 − pci2 = (3+ 2βkc)
(
p∗i1 − pci1
)
< 0.
Replacing the equilibrium limited commitment prices for c2 = cmin2 into Ds (p1) and Q2, we
obtain an interior solution, i.e., D∗is > 0 and Q∗i2 > 0. Therefore, there exists a range for
c2 ≥ cmin2 such that p∗iτ < pciτ , τ ∈ {1, 2}.
3 Uncertainty about production costs
To introduce cost uncertainty, we consider a stochastic term θ, which positively affects c2 such
that E [c2] > c1. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that c2 = c1 + ∆c + θ, where ∆c > 0 is
a constant and the stochastic term θ has zero mean. In the following remark, we characterize
the convexity of the profit function Π∗s (·) and the convexity of the consumer surplus function
Ψ
∗s (·) with respect to θ under limited commitment in the presence of consumer storage.
Remark 4 It holds
(i) ∂
2
Π
∗s
∂θ2
> 0;
(ii) ∂
2
Ψ
∗s
∂θ2
> 0 if and only if
(
∂p∗s2
∂θ
)2
D′ (p∗s2 ) +
∂2p∗s2
∂θ2
D (p∗s2 ) < 0.
Proof of Remark 4. As θ does not affect p1, we can restrict our attention to the second period
profits
Π2 = (p2 − c1 − ∆c− θ) [D (p2)− Ds (p1)] . (S7)
Maximizing Π2 (·) with respect to p2, we obtain the following first-order condition
D (p2)− Ds (p1) + (p2 − c1 − ∆c− θ) D′ (p2) = 0, (S8)
which gives the equilibrium second period price p∗s2 . We find from the implicit function theo-
rem that
∂p∗s2
∂θ
=
D′ (p∗s2 )
2D′ (p∗s2 ) + (p
∗s
2 − c1 − ∆c− θ) D′′ (p∗s2 )
> 0, (S9)
where the inequality follows from Assumption 1 and D′ (·) < 0. Using (S7) and (S8) yields
∂Π∗s
∂θ
=
∂Π∗s2
∂θ
=
(
∂p∗s2
∂θ
− 1
)
[D (p∗s2 )− Ds (p∗s1 )] + (p∗s2 − c1 − ∆c− θ) D′ (p∗s2 )
∂p∗s2
∂θ
= − [D (p∗s2 )− Ds (p∗s1 )] .
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As DN2 (·) ≡ D (p2)− Ds (p1), we find that
∂2Π∗s
∂θ2
= −∂D
N
2 (p
∗s
2 )
∂θ
= −D′ (p∗s2 )
∂p∗s2
∂θ
> 0,
where the inequality follows from (S9).
In the second period, consumers buy at p∗s2 (θ) from the firm and competitive, risk-neutral
arbitrageurs.3 The equilibrium consumer surplus can be written as
Ψ
∗s (θ) =
∫
p∗s1
D (p) dp +
∫
p∗s2 (θ)
D (p) dp.
Applying Leibniz’s rule yields
∂Ψ∗s
∂θ
= −∂p
∗s
2
∂θ
D (p∗s2 ) .
Then, we find that
∂2Ψ∗s
∂θ2
= −
(
∂p∗s2
∂θ
)2
D′ (p∗s2 )−
∂2p∗s2
∂θ2
D (p∗s2 ) .
A sufficient (albeit not necessary) condition for ∂
2
Ψ
∗s
∂θ2
> 0 is that
∂2p∗s2
∂θ2
≤ 0. This is satisfied un-
der fairly standard demand specifications, such as linear, exponential and iso-elastic demand
functions.
4 Convex production costs
In the following remark, we derive the conditions under which limited commitment leads
to lower prices in the presence of convex production costs. We denote by Cτ (·) the total
production costs in period τ ∈ {1, 2}, where C′τ (·) ≥ 0 and C′′τ (·) > 0. Moreover, we as-
sume that C′2 (·) > C′1 (·) at given quantities. We focus on the plausible situation where con-
sumers store to a lower extent under limited commitment than under full commitment for
given prices. Evaluating consumer storage at the equilibrium limited commitment prices, we
have D∗cs < Dcc∗s .
Remark 5 Suppose 0 < D∗cs < Dcc∗s . Then, in each period the price under limited commitment is
lower than the price under full commitment, i.e., p∗cτ < pccτ , τ ∈ {1, 2}, if
∂DN2 (p∗c1 )
∂p1
> 0.
Proof of Remark 5. Using the binding storability constraint p2 = p1 + sc, the firm’s aggregate
profits are
Π
c = p1 [D (p1) + Ds (·)]− C1 (D (p1) + Ds (·))
+ ( p1 + sc) [D ( p1 + sc)− Ds (·)]− C2 (D ( p1 + sc)− Ds (·)) . (S10)
3As discussed in Section 8, the presence of arbitrageurs implies that E [p2] = p1 + sc. It can be easily shown
that the results are qualitatively unaffected when the arbitrageurs do not operate and consumers directly engage
in storage activities.
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Under full commitment, differentiating (S10) with respect to p1 and Ds yields the following
first-order conditions
D (p1) + D ( p1 + sc) + p1D
′ ( p1) + ( p1 + sc) D′ ( p1 + sc)
−C′1 (·) D′ ( p1)− C′2 (·) D′ ( p1 + sc) = 0 (S11)
−sc − C′1 (·) + C′2 (·) ≤ 0. (S12)
Condition (S11) determines the equilibrium full commitment prices pcc1 and p
cc
2 = p
cc
1 + sc.
It follows from (S12) that Dccs > 0 in equilibrium for sc < s˜
cc
c ≡ C′2
(
D
(
pcc1 |Ds=0 + sc
))
−
C′1
(
D
(
pcc1 |Ds=0
))
. The assumption that C′2 (·) > C′1 (·) at given quantities is a (necessary)
condition for s˜ccc > 0. This implies that (S12) holds with equality.
Under limited commitment, proceeding backwards, the firm faces the following second
period maximization problem
max
p2
p2 [D ( p2)− Ds (p1)]− C2 (D ( p2)− Ds (p1)) .
Using the binding storability constraint p2 = p1 + sc, the first-order condition for p2 is
D (p1 + sc)− Ds (p1) + (p1 + sc) D′ ( p1 + sc)− C′2 (·) D′ ( p1 + sc) = 0. (S13)
It follows from the implicit function theorem that consumer storage Ds is such that
∂Ds
∂p1
< 0.
Moving to the first period and differentiating (S10), where Ds (p1) satisfies (S13), the first-order
condition for p1 is given by
D (p1) + D ( p1 + sc) + p1D
′ ( p1) + ( p1 + sc) D′ ( p1 + sc)− C′1 (·) D′ ( p1)
−C′2 (·) D′ ( p1 + sc)−
[
sc + C
′
1 (·)− C′2 (·)
] ∂Ds (p1)
∂p1
= 0, (S14)
which yields the equilibrium limited commitment prices p∗c1 and p
∗c
2 = p
∗c
1 + sc. Substituting
the first-order condition for p∗c1 in (S14) into the left-hand side of the first-order condition for
pcc1 in (S11) yields
D′ (p∗c1 )
[
C′1 (D (p
∗c
1 ) + D
∗c
s )− C′1 (D (p∗c1 ) + Dcc∗s )
]
+ D′ (p∗c1 + sc)
[
C′2 (D (p
∗c
1 + sc)− D∗cs )− C′2 (D (p∗c1 + sc)− Dcc∗s )
]
+
∂Ds (p∗c1 )
∂p1
[
sc + C
′
1 (D (p
∗c
1 ) + D
∗c
s )− C′2 (D (p∗c1 + sc)− D∗cs )
]
.
After some manipulation, this expression can be rewritten as
D′ (p∗c1 )
[
C′1 (D (p
∗c
1 ) + D
∗c
s )− C′1 (D (p∗c1 ) + Dcc∗s )
]
+
∂DN2 (p
∗c
1 )
∂p1
[
C′2 (D (p
∗c
1 + sc)− D∗cs )− C′2 (D (p∗c1 + sc)− Dcc∗s )
]
+
∂Ds (p∗c1 )
∂p1
[
sc + C
′
1 (D (p
∗c
1 ) + D
∗c
s )− C′2 (D (p∗c1 + sc)− Dcc∗s )
]
, (S15)
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where
∂DN2 (p∗c1 )
∂p1
= D′ (p∗c1 + sc) −
∂Ds(p∗c1 )
∂p1
. Note from D∗cs < Dcc∗s and (S12) that the last ex-
pression in square brackets is negative. As ∂Ds∂p1 < 0, the entire expression (S15) is positive if
∂DN2 (p∗s1 )
∂p1
> 0. As pcc2 = p
cc
1 + sc and p
∗c
2 = p
∗c
1 + sc, it follows from Assumption 1 that p
∗c
τ < p
cc
τ ,
τ ∈ {1, 2}, if ∂D
N
2 (p∗s1 )
∂p1
> 0.
5 Durable goods
In the following remark, we derive some relevant results in a two-period framework where
a durable good monopolist faces a linear demand of the form D (pτ) = α − βpτ, τ ∈ {1, 2},
with α > 0 and β > 0. We denote by pcdτ and p
∗d
τ the equilibrium prices under full and limited
commitment in period τ, respectively, and by qcdτ and q
∗d
τ the corresponding quantities.
Remark 6 It holds
(i) pcdτ > p
∗d
τ , τ ∈ {1, 2};
(ii) p∗d1 > p
∗d
2 ;
(iii) for a given c1,
∂p∗d1
∂∆c < 0 and
∂p∗d2
∂∆c > 0, with
∂p∗d2
∂∆c >
∣∣∣ ∂p∗d1∂∆c ∣∣∣.
Proof of Remark 6. Under full commitment, the price that the firm charges in the first period
is p1 =
2
β (α− q1). The firm’s maximization problem is given by
max
q1
2
β
(α− q1) q1 − c1q1.
Taking the first-order condition for q1 yields q
cd
1 =
2α−βc1
4 , which implies p
cd
1 =
2
β
(
α− qcd1
)
=
2α+βc1
2β . Moreover, we have q
cd
2 = 0 and p
cd
2 =
α
β −
qcd1 +q
cd
2
β =
2α+βc1
4β .
Under limited commitment, proceeding backwards, in the second period the firm solves
max
q2
(
α
β
− q1 + q2
β
)
q2 − c2q2,
where the expression in round brackets is the price in the second period. It follows from the
first-order condition for q2 that q2 (q1) =
α−q1−βc2
2 and p2 (q1) =
α
β − q1+q
cd
2
β =
α−q1+βc2
2β . Moving
to the first period, we have
max
q1
3 (α− q1) + βc2
2β
q1 − c1q1 + (α− q1 − βc2)
2
4β
,
where the first ratio corresponds to the first period price p1 =
α−q1
β + p2. Taking the first-order
condition for q1 yields q
∗d
1 =
2(α+β∆c)
5 , which implies p
∗d
1 =
3(α−q∗d1 )+βc2
2β =
9α+6βc1−βc2
10β . More-
over, we have q∗d2 =
α−q∗d1 −βc2
2 =
3α+2βc1−7βc2
10 and p
∗d
2 =
α−q∗d1 +βc2
2β =
3α+2βc1+3βc2
10β . Standard
computations show that pcdτ > p
∗d
τ , τ ∈ {1, 2}, and p∗d1 > p∗d2 . For a given c1, we find that
∂p∗d1
∂∆c = − 110 < 0 and ∂p
∗d
2
∂∆c =
3
10 > 0, with
∂p∗d2
∂∆c >
∣∣∣ ∂p∗d1∂∆c ∣∣∣.
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6 Discount factor
We now consider a general discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1]. Adopting the same rationale as in the
baseline model, there exists a threshold slδc such that for sc < s
lδ
c consumer storage occurs
irrespective of the firm’s commitment powers. The following remark extends our results to a
discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1] in the presence of consumer storage.
Remark 7 Suppose sc < s
lδ
c , where s
lδ
c ≤ δc2 − c1. Then, in each period the price under limited
commitment is lower than the price under full commitment, i.e., p∗δτ < pcδτ , τ ∈ {1, 2}, if and only if
∂DN2 (p∗δ1 )
∂p1
> 0.
Proof of Remark 7. Given that the storability constraint is binding, i.e., p1 + sc = δp2, the
firm’s aggregate profits correspond to
Π
δ = (p1 − c1) [D (p1) + Ds (p1)] + δ
(
p1 + sc
δ
− c2
) [
D
(
p1 + sc
δ
)
− Ds (p1)
]
. (S16)
Under full commitment, consumer storage occurs if and only if sc < δc2 − c1. Specifically,
the firm prefers to induce full consumer storage, i.e., Ds (p1) = D
(
p1+sc
δ
)
. The firm’s problem
of maximizing its profits in (S16) reduces to
max
p1
(p1 − c1)
[
D (p1) + D
(
p1 + sc
δ
)]
.
The first-order condition for p1 is
D (p1) + D
(
p1 + sc
δ
)
+ (p1 − c1)
[
D′ (p1) + D′
(
p1 + sc
δ
)
1
δ
]
= 0. (S17)
Under limited commitment, it follows from the first-order condition for the second period
profit maximization and from the binding storability constraint p1 + sc = δp2 that Ds (p1) =
max
{
0,D
(
p1+sc
δ
)
+
(
p1+sc
δ − c2
)
D′
(
p1+sc
δ
)}
. Let slδc be the threshold for sc below which con-
sumer storage occurs under the two commitment regimes. This implies that slδc ≤ δc2− c1. For
sc < s
lδ
c , we have Ds (p1) > 0. Using (S16), the first-order condition for p1 can be written as
D (p1) + D
(
p1 + sc
δ
)
+ (p1 − c1) D′ (p1)
+
(
p1 + sc
δ
− c2
)
D′
(
p1 + sc
δ
)
+
∂Ds (p1)
∂p1
(δc2 − c1 − sc) = 0. (S18)
After substituting the first-order condition for p∗δ1 in (S18) into the left-hand side of the
first-order condition for pcδ1 in (S17) and using D
N
2 (p1) ≡ D
(
p1+sc
δ
)
− Ds (p1), we find that
(δc2 − c1 − sc)
∂DN2
(
p∗δ1
)
∂p1
> 0,
where the inequality holds if and only if
∂DN2 (p∗δ1 )
∂p1
> 0 (recall sc < s
lδ
c ≤ δc2− c1). As pcδ2 = p
cδ
1 +sc
δ
and p∗δ2 =
p∗δ1 +sc
δ , it follows from Assumption 1 that p
∗δ
τ < p
cδ
τ , τ ∈ {1, 2}, if and only if
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∂DN2 (p∗δ1 )
∂p1
> 0. With a linear demand function of the form D (pτ) = α − βpτ, τ ∈ {1, 2},
where α > 0 and β > 0, the equilibrium prices are pcδ1 =
2αδ+βc1(1+δ)−βsc
2β(1+δ)
and pcδ2 =
pcδ1 +sc
δ
under full commitment, while they are p∗δ1 =
2αδ+βc1(2+δ)−βδc2
2β(1+δ)
and p∗δ2 =
p∗δ1 +sc
δ under limited
commitment. Standard computations show that
∂pcδτ
∂δ > 0 and
∂p∗δτ
∂δ > 0, τ ∈ {1, 2}. Taking
the price difference between two commitment regimes yields ∆pδ ≡ pcδ1 − p∗δ1 = pcδ2 − p∗δ2 =
δc2−c1−sc
2(1+δ)
> 0 (recall sc < s
lδ
c ≤ δc2 − c1). Then, we find that ∂∆p
δ
∂δ > 0.
7 Linear demand
In the following remarks, we characterize the main results of the paper in a framework with a
linear demand of the form D (pτ) = α− βpτ, τ ∈ {1, 2}, where α > 0 and β > 0. The threshold
values are defined in the proofs.
Remark 8 Suppose sc < s
∗
c . Then,
(i) under full commitment, consumer storage is Dcss =
2α−2βc1−3βsc
4 , and prices are p
cs
1 =
2α+2βc1−βsc
4β
and pcs2 =
2α+2βc1+3βsc
4β ;
(ii) under limited commitment, consumer storage is D∗ss = 32β∆c − 2βsc, and prices are p∗s1 =
2α+2βc1−β∆c
4β and p
∗s
2 =
2α+2βc1−β∆c+4βsc
4β .
Consumer surplus is higher under limited commitment than under full commitment. Total welfare
is higher under limited commitment than under full commitment if and only if ∆c > ∆˜c.
Proof of Remark 8. As ∆µm = −∆c2 < 0 and ∆c + ∆µm = ∆c2 < s˜∗c = 34∆c, it follows from
the proof of Proposition 3 that case (I) applies and slc in (A14) corresponds to s
∗
c . The results in
points (i) and (ii) of the remark are a direct application of Corollaries 1 and 3 (recall from the
proof of Proposition 3 that s∗c < scc). Under full commitment, consumer surplus and the firm’s
profits are respectively
Ψ
cs =
4 (α− βc1)2 − 4β (α− βc1) sc + 5β2s2c
16β
(S19)
and
Π
cs =
[2α− β (2c1 + sc)]2
8β
. (S20)
Under limited commitment, consumer surplus and the firm’s profits are respectively
Ψ
∗s =
[2α− β (2c1 − ∆c)]2 − 4β [2α− β (2c1 − ∆c)] sc + 8β2s2c
16β
(S21)
and
Π
∗s =
4α2 − 4αβ (2c1 + ∆c) + β2
(
4c21 + 4c1∆c + 9∆c
2 − 16sc∆c + 8s2c
)
8β
. (S22)
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When the static monopoly prices are charged, consumer surplus and the firm’s profits are
respectively
Ψ
m =
2 (α− βc1)2 − 2β (α− βc1)∆c + β2∆c2
8β
(S23)
and
Π
m =
2 (α− βc1)2 − 2β (α− βc1)∆c + β2∆c2
4β
. (S24)
To compute the threshold s∗c , we use (S22) and (S24), which yields Π∗s > Πm if and only if
sc < s
∗
c , where s
∗
c =
(
1− 1
2
√
2
)
∆c (see Corollary 3). Now, we turn to the welfare analysis. Tak-
ing the difference between (S21) and (S19) yields ∆Ψ ≡ Ψ∗s−Ψcs = 4α−β(4c1−∆c+3sc)16 (∆c− sc) >
0, where the inequality follows from the assumptions on the parameters of the model. Taking
the difference between (S22) and (S20) yields ∆Π ≡ Π∗s −Πcs = − 4α−β(4c1+9∆c−7sc)8 (∆c− sc) <
0 (the limited commitment profits are lower than the full commitment profits). Then, we ob-
tain ∆W ≡ ∆Ψ + ∆Π = − 4α−β(4c1+19∆c−17sc)16 (∆c− sc). It holds ∆W > 0 if and only if ∆c > ∆˜c,
where ∆˜c ≡ 4α−4βc1+17βsc19β , with ∂∆˜c∂β < 0. Note that ∆˜c < ∆̂c ≡ 2α−2βc1+4βsc5β , which ensures that
the second period profit margin is positive.
Remark 9 A. Suppose s∗c ≤ sc < scc. Then,
(i) under full commitment, consumer storage is Dcss =
2α−2βc1−3βsc
4 , and prices are p
cs
1 =
2α+2βc1−βsc
4β
and pcs2 =
2α+2βc1+3βsc
4β ;
(ii) under limited commitment, consumer storage is Dms = 0, and prices are p
m
1 =
α+βc1
2β and
pm2 =
α+βc1+β∆c
2β .
Consumer surplus and total welfare are lower under limited commitment than under full commit-
ment.
B. Suppose sc ≥ scc. Then, the static monopoly solution in point (ii) applies under the two commit-
ment regimes.
Proof of Remark 9. A. It follows from the proof of Proposition 4 that shc in (A15) corresponds
to scc. Using (S20) and (S24), we obtain Π
cs
> Π
m if and only if sc < s
c
c, where s
c
c =
2(α−βc1)
β −√
2
β
√
2 (α− βc1)2 − β (2α− 2βc1 − β∆c)∆c (see Corollary 1). The results in points (i) and (ii) of
the remark are a direct application of Corollaries 1 and 3. Taking the difference between (S23)
and (S19) yields ∆Ψ ≡ Ψm −Ψcs = − 4α(∆c−sc)−β[2∆c(2c1+∆c)−4c1sc−5s
2
c ]
16 < 0, where the inequality
follows from the assumptions on the parameters of the model. As ∆Π ≡ Πm − Πcs < 0, it
holds ∆W ≡ ∆Ψ + ∆Π < 0.
B. The proof follows from Corollaries 1 and 3.
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